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Abstract: 
The Treaty of Lisbon has brought remarkable changes and innovations to the 
European Union. As far as the Council of Ministers of the European Union (“the 
Council” hereinafter) is concerned, there are two significant innovations: double 
qualified majority voting and new rotating Presidency scheme, which are 
considered to make the working of the Council more efficiently, stably and 
consistently. With the modification relating to other key institutions, the 
Commission and the European Parliament, and with certain procedures being 
re-codified, the power of the Council varies accordingly, where the 
inter-institutional balance counts for more research. As the Council is one of the 
co-legislatures of the Union, the legislative function of it would be probably 
influenced, positively or negatively, by the internal innovations and the 
inter-institutional re-balance. Has the legislative function of the Council been 
reinforced or not? How could the Council better reach its functional goal 
designed by the Treaties’ drafter? How to evaluate the Council’s evolution after 
Lisbon Treaty in the light of European integration? This thesis is attempting to 
find the answers by analyzing two main internal innovations and 
inter-institutional re-balance thereinafter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The EU Council, to be called as “the Council” hereinafter in the thesis, is 
composed of the ministers from each Member States, representing the interest of 
national governments.  
According to the Treaties, specifically article 16 of Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), the Council shall undertake the tasks mainly of the legislative and 
budgetary functions jointly with the European Parliament; it shall also carry out 
policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties. The 
former two functions are the core of EU decision-making power within its 
competence. They enable the Union functioning in a manner as an organism 
compatible with the general principle of rule of law, which not only deepens the 
never stopped economic integration but also tends to support the political 
integration and social solidarity of this largest regional economy in the world.  
The story of the power, or the function, of the Council was not as present time 
when the predecessor of EU firstly came into form.  
From the era of European Coal and Steel Community，it also undertook a role 
as a political coordinator at both high and low political levels. Since 1975, 
European Council had emerged as an entity as political communication among 
Member States. The heads of states or of government of Member States met in 
European Council on the Community’s affairs. Although, the European Council 
was considered as a distinct existence from the Council, the Council’s rotating 
presidency held the chairmanship of this supreme level political forum and 
coordinated high politics among the European leaders in order to reach an 
all-welcomed solution. At the meantime, low political coordination also occurred 
as day-to-day work within the Council when draft legislative acts were under 
examination by COREPER and the Working Groups. For almost half a century, 
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the Council and its presidency have acted as vital political role concerning both 
external and internal affairs of the Union / Community.  
The Treaty of Lisbon confirms the European Council as a formal EU 
institution and creates the post for a permanent president of the European 
Council, which ends the high political function of the Council ever. There leaves 
the low political coordinating task in the internal deliberation in the Council no 
higher than ministers’ level. The typical intergovernmental method seems to 
thoroughly transfer to the new born institution and its presidency, with the 
functional role has been the reinforced label attached on the Council.  
Furthermore, the majority voting scheme has also been progressed to be a 
general rule which makes this legislative institution much closer to a half 
supranational method, although under the comparison with the Commission and 
the European Parliament, the Council would  be concerned as an 
inter-governmental method.  
As far as the legislature is concerned, before Maastricht Treaty, the Council 
was the sole institution as legislature, while the European Parliament was not 
able to have a final word in the Community law-making stage.  
From 1993 when Maastricht Treaty came into force until time flies to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the law-making within the EU has undergone the process from 
co-operation to co-legislation, where the momentum of the balancing the 
decision-making power between the Council and the European Parliament has 
gradually inclined to the latter to reach onto equal footing with the former.  
Nevertheless, the Council, at least, cannot be over weighted by the European 
Parliament’s stance that far since the adopted pieces of legislation would be 
finally carried out in practice within each Member State, which makes the 
Member States still have that final say on the acceptance of a particular 
legislation in the Council.    
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As one of the three core institutions, vis-a-vis the European Parliament, the 
Council had exclusively pivotal influence upon the Commission at pre-Lisbon 
time, for instances, requesting particular studies and legislative proposals, 
entrusting non-binding legislation and also mandating international negotiation.  
In post-Lisbon time, Commission began to officially have two mandators: the 
Council, and the European Parliament. Commission’s president is elected by the 
EP. All the Commissioners as a whole are to be proved in the EP. In addition to 
the political control at this initiative phase, EP imposes the shadow upon the 
Commission by “censure” deriving from the Treaties and also series of 
derivatives such as being fully informed at all stages of policy making ruled by 
Inter-institutional agreement.  
In this circumstance, the Council, firstly, is no longer the sole supervisor of 
the Commission. Co-legislatures both have the right to request of undertaking 
studies and of certain proposing draft legislative acts; both the Council the 
European Parliament could invoke delegations upon the Commission adopting 
non-legislative act, such as implementing act and delegating act, in which 
procedures the two institutions have the strengthened power of scrutiny that was 
uniquely controlled in the Council’s hands before. Sometimes, particularly in the 
sphere of international agreement negotiation, it is the combination of the 
Council and the Commission to face the parliamentary inquiry.  
Furthermore, from the view of Commission, the Council seems to be less 
attractive than the European Parliament because of the democracy and 
legitimacy providing by the latter, which has been the Commission’s main 
deficiency long being criticized. However, the European Parliament is not the 
substitute where the supervision upon the Commission is concerned. The 
Commission still works with the Council in practice as almost the same as 
pre-Lisbon time.  
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The waning power of the Council deserves consideration on its genuine effect. 
Whether does it discourage the Council, or does it caters the entire operation 
between EU institutions and reinforce the legislative function of the Council in 
return?  
To evaluate the legislative function of the Council, firstly, this thesis 
introduces the internal decision-making scheme.  
The competence of the Council presidency has been limited to low political 
coordination, with handing over high politics to the President of European 
Council. The rotating presidency chairs concentrate the internal horizontal and 
vertical affairs. The general application of Qualified Majority Voting, instead of 
the unanimity, distinguishes the Council, even the EU, from the general 
inter-governmental instrument in the sense of classic international law. A 
standard good legislative functioning should obey the rule of procedure at all 
time and at all stages, where it should be of no doubt of its transparency. Most of 
the workload in the Council is handled by the permanent representatives or their 
deputies from Member States (COREPER), rather by the ministers who are the 
symbol of this institution. The COREPER frequently negotiate beyond the round 
table under the coordination of rotating presidency, and the voting at official 
ministers’ level is rare or perfunctory. In this case, it may decline the impression 
of a good legislative functioning. Whereas, the EU is composed of each Member 
States who are the real actors implementing the EU legal text. Thus, to wipe out 
the controversy at the negotiation step might be the better path to make the 
legislative acts applying smoothly in the end. To this extent, that unusual 
law-making way, comparing to traditional intergovernmental legislative organ, 
seems to be better suitable for the Union. The legislative function of the Council 
therefore is evaluated as positive. 
In the second and third chapters, the inter-institutional relationship is under 
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examination. Lisbon Treaty has re-balanced the power among EU core 
institutions: the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.  
The Treaties tend to better clarify the boundary of competence of each 
institution in order to draw a triangle check and balance. In this process, it is 
inevitable that the Council’s power wanes while the European Parliament rises, 
placing the Commission at the very middle spot between the two.  
It is not the latter robs the former. It is the aim of Lisbon Treaty in its first 
article writing that this Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as 
openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. The integration has 
developed to a comprehensive stage concerning more on the self-identification 
of EU citizens. Therefore it is the time to spur the revolution of Parliamentary 
power in the Union. A powerful European Parliament actually promotes the 
functional role of the Council as one of the legislature operating in a fine way. 
Consequently, the democratic deficit would be filled. All the three interests 
existing in the EU are safeguarded all by strong representatives.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INNOVATIONS BYT THE TREATY OF LISBON IN 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
SECTION 1. VOTING SYSTEM ---- QUALIFIED MAJORITY 
VOTING(QMV)  
1. QMV as common rule  
According to Lisbon Treaty, one of the innovations to the working procedure 
of EU Council is the new system of QMV ----a double majority system---- and 
the situation under which the QMV is used. The aim of this new system is to 
facilitate the decision-making in the Council in the ever enlarged membership.  
For the situation under which the Council act by QMV, it has been existing for 
a considerable period and it is first time to be written in the Treaty become the 
common rule except where the Treaties provide otherwise. (Art 16(3) TEU) the 
areas of using QMV have increased by 45 or more, for instance: MS withdraw 
from EU, immigration, freedom to establishment. But still in some vital aspects or 
areas, there uses the “unanimity”, for example the membership of the Union, 
taxation, finances of the union, citizenship and certain provisions in the field of 
justice and home affairs. 
1. New calculating method of QMV 
 For the new method to calculate the qualified majority it has been discussed 
once during the IGC of Nice Treaty1but finally come to be formalized until 
Lisbon Treaty.  In the TFEU, Article 238 gives the basic rules of the new 
                                                             
1
 “A double majority system (50per cent of Member States and 50 per cent of population at the 
time) had been advocated during the Nice IGC by the smaller Member States, Germany and the 
Commission, but had been opposed by the other large Member States, particularly France and 
Spain.” Piris, with a foreword by Angela Merkel, The Lisbon Treaty: A legal and Political 
Analysis , Cambridge university press, 2010，p.220 
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calculation of QMV which considers the proportion of the members (votes) in 
favor together with the representing population proportion of the EU. 
Furthermore, the Protocol 36 of Lisbon Treaty lays down the Transitional 
Provisions which divide the transitional years into three periods, which gradually 
adapt the new system until March 31, 2017. (See Box 1) 
Box 1 
proposal from the 
Commission  or the 
HR 
If not 
Check / Request (by  
a member) 
Now to 
31/10/2014 
255 votes 
255votes + 2/3 of the 
members 
Check: + 62% of the 
population 
1/11/2014 
to 
31/3/2017 
55% of the members + 
65% of the population 
72% of the members 
+ 65% of the population 
Request: by the 
former method above 
After 
1/4/2017 
55% of the members + 
65% of the population 
72% of the members 
+ 65% of the population 
NO 
The new standard “population” means much more than wide-representing. It 
is a sign of politics and the ideal of democracy. For the EU was established on 
the base of the democratic agreement, it is not doubtable that the factor of 
population become a threshold sooner or later.  
When Germany reunified the early 1990s, German population rocketed to the 
very top among the Member States. Since then, Germany never stops its step to 
ask for more voting weights and seats in the Council and also the Commission 
and the Parliament. Especially in the Nice IGC, “since the double majority 
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system being opposed by France and Spain, Germany requested and obtained an 
additional procedure “the population safety net”, under which (art.205(4)TEC) a 
Council member may request verification that Member States constituting the 
qualified majority represent at least 62 per cent of the total population of the 
Union.”2 
Once population is mentioned, nationality always stands out as the standard. 
But, with the internal market policy (esp. free-movement-of-persons), EU 
citizens who have “moved” from their original countries, especially the ones are 
holding the resident permit for more than three months, have relatively fewer 
links with their home member states while more close relations with the host 
member states and may attain an interaction with the social, economic and even 
political life of the host member states.  
There is the case whether the measurement should calculate these well social 
integrated persons as the “population” defined in the Treaties’ provisions, who 
are increasingly representing the requirements of the host member state to a 
certain extent, which should not be ignored. In addition, the persons who hold 
dual-nationality may be another question on the population calculating. Then, 
the “residents with the EU citizenship” may be interpreted as the “population” in 
the light of Art.238 TFEU.  
Besides, whether the people with foreign nationality who are legally reside in 
the EU can be concerned when the Council is making the decision caring about 
the ordinary EU affairs (not concerning about the border control or immigration 
law)?  
A similar case in China, big cities, like Beijing and Shenzhen, have being 
embraced a huge number of persons from other provinces. And the people from 
                                                             
2
 Piris, with a foreword by Angela Merkel, The Lisbon Treaty: A legal and Political Analysis, 
Cambridge university press, 2010, p.220 
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“outside” have been a necessary and vital part of the development of the host 
cities, which force the government and Chinese Congress of People’s 
Representatives to seriously concern about those group of people when they are 
making decisions about the country’s or the cities’ routing affairs.  
Maybe the situations are different because of the distinction between a 
member state inside an international organization and a city inside a country, but 
the aim of social representing is the same. The quantity of persons which a 
member states contains at a certain time concerns lots of account on the social 
resources, the scale of functioning of the state regime and even the general state 
interests. More people, more state interest involves. Vice versa, if a member state 
have a large proportion of nationals living abroad (like Romania) where in the 
Council it still vote according to the original population statistic, how do other 
Member States react? Or even more in the case that if the Romanian migrants 
flood to another Member State (for example Italy) where the host Member 
State’s population voting weight does not increase on behalf of the acceptance of 
the migrants, whether will the host Member State argue for change? In so far, we 
have not seen the rule of population measurement. But it should not be ignored 
in the soon coming implementation of the new Qualified Majority Voting 
system.  
The new QMV has been “striking a compromise between the large and small 
EU member states”.3 Before the new QMV system, there are three voting 
method: Simple Majority Voting, Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity.  
The Simple Majority Voting gives each Member State the same weight in 
which the small Member States do not have different voting power comparing 
with their large counterparts.  
                                                             
3
 Gron and Wivel, Maximizing influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: from 
small state policy to smart state strategy, Journal of European Integration Vol. 33, No. 5, 
523-539, September, 2011, p527 
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In Unanimity, any single Member State has a veto power to block the adoption 
of a draft act no matter the size of the country.  
The ever existing Qualified Majority Voting has favored the large Member 
States more than the small ones. Because the voting weights varies according to 
the size and “it is easier for the large states to build a successful coalition,… and 
it also becomes impossible to form a blocking minority without the participation 
of the large member states”4 In order to balance the voting power inside the 
Council, particularly with an ever enlarged and diversified EU, the new QMV 
system requires double thresholds, proportions of both members and population 
in favor,  in every case requiring a qualified majority in support.  
2. Majority and Minority 
The process of negotiation to come to an agreement of the two threshold of 
QMV is another stage on which Member States take full use of their efforts to 
protect their national interests.  
Larger states thought the population threshold was too low comparing the ever 
existing voting weight. While the smaller states argued that the standard of 
population proportion was too high for them to stop an act when the standard of 
members in favor was easily met.  
In general, on one hand, Member States take into account of how to constitute 
a qualified majority and prevent being outvoted. On the other hand, they 
calculate how to achieve the blocking-minority power. In both of these two 
scenarios, Member States naturally think of an alliance among themselves to 
create a sort of power to protect their similar national interests. Although the 
negotiators may act as mathematicians on amending the Treaties, the group of 
majorities or minorities varies almost all the time according to national interests 
                                                             
4 Gron and Wivel, Maximizing influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: from 
small state policy to smart state strategy, Journal of European Integration Vol. 33, No. 5, 
523-539, September, 2011, p527 
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case by case.  
Theoretically, on one hand, if we rank all the MS according to their population 
(See Box 2), the voting weights summed up of the top 5 MS (Germany, France, 
the UK, Italy and Spain) have already occupied a proportion of population of 
62.4%. They are Member States with a long history of EU membership which 
have sailed the big ship full of experiences and they may in large chances have 
closer links and interests in common with each other rather than with the 
younger members into the EU. If they combine as a group and persuade another 
10 Member States to vote on the same side, in the light of the great disparity in 
voting weight and population proportion and the probability of divergence 
among the others, they may easily lead the trend (or even dominate) in the 
Council.  
However, at the same time, the blocking minority according to Lisbon Treaty 
is “at least four members”. As far as the majority can come to collect much 
easier, there is still an easy remedy to block when some Member States may 
strongly oppose to an act.  
As far as I am concerned, the scenario above may rarely happen.  
For the European Council by now has been the role of political negotiation on 
high politics, the EU’s priorities have been set largely upon it. When a 
controversial issue comes to the necessity of EU legislation, the heads of 
government or states will meet firstly to discuss and comprise in European 
Council. As a result of the agenda setting and framework idea agreed made by 
the European Council after that negotiation, the debate then in the Council will 
not be as severe as the Member States required to form a coalition of blocking 
minority.  
In the case of low politics, the Council deals with the draft acts issue by issue, 
splitting the whole piece into points for the negotiation among Member States, to 
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find most largely support step by step. Consequently, the Council frequently can 
adopt the acts with the amendments on which almost all the members agree. The 
details of negotiation and working practice in the Council will be discussed in 
the following section. 
On the other hand, new rule of QMV on the 55% majority of the members 
counts more favor for the small Member States. For the situation before the new 
rule applies, the majority in the Council is 255 votes out of in total 345votes. 
And from 1st of July 2013, Croatia came in to EU membership which alter the 
total votes from 345 to 352; qualified majority as 260 instead of 255. The 
voting-weight links to the population of the Member State. Although the voting 
power per capita of small Member States is over weighted than the larger ones, 
the majority voting counts the absolute number of votes of which small ones still 
possess fewer votes. When new rule comes into force, the voting weight will be 
waved off and the majority counts on the numbers of the Member States in favor, 
in which the voting power per state and the absolute number are the same 
between the larger Member States and the smaller ones, and the latter are 
considered to be well protected.  
Box 2 
MS 
Transitional period of 
Lisbon Treaty 
Lisbon Treaty after 1
st
Nov. 
2014 
votes （%） population （%） 
Germany 29 8.2% 80,523,700 15.9% 
France 29 8.2% 65,633,200 12.9% 
United 
Kingdom 
29 8.2% 63,730,100 12.6% 
Italy 29 8.2% 59,685,200 11.8% 
Spain 27 7.6% 46,704,300 9.2% 
Poland 27 7.6% 38,533,300 7.6% 
Romania 14 4.0% 20,057,500 3.9% 
Netherlands 13 3.6% 16,779,600 3.3% 
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Sources from: 
Protocol No. 36 of Lisbon Treaty;  
For the time being, Croatia came in to membership from 1 July 2013, which 
alter the total votes from 345 to 352; qualified majority as 260 instead of 255 or 
15 Member States not 14 anymore  
(from “voting calculation” on the website of Council of EU: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/voting-calculator?lang=en)  
The population statistics form origins from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_the_European_Union 
 
Belgium 12 3.4% 11,161,600 2.3% 
Greece 12 3.4% 11,062,500 2.2% 
Czech 
Republic 
12 3.4% 10,516,100 2.1% 
Portugal 12 3.4% 10,487,300 2.1% 
Hungary 12 3.4% 9,908,800 2.0% 
Sweden 10 2.8% 9,555,900 1.9% 
Austria 10 2.8% 8,451,900 1.7% 
Bulgaria 10 2.8% 7,284,600 1.4% 
Denmark 7 2.0% 5,602,600 1.1% 
Finland 7 2.0% 5,426,700 1.1% 
Slovakia 7 2.0% 5,410,800 1.1% 
Ireland 7 2.0% 4,591,100 0.9% 
Croatia 7 2.0% 4,262,100 0.8% 
Lithuania 7 2.0% 2,971,900 0.7% 
Slovenia 4 1.2% 2,058,800 0.5% 
Latvia 4 1.2% 2,023,800 0.4% 
Estonia 4 1.2% 1,324,800 0.3% 
Cyprus 4 1.2% 865,900 0.2% 
Luxembourg 4 1.2% 537,000 0.1% 
Malta 3 0.9% 421,400 0.1% 
Total 352 100% 505,572,500 100% 
Qualified 
majority 
260 74% 328,622,125 65% 
 21 / 141 
 
Comparing with the Commission, which stands for the general interest of the 
Union, the Council is representing the national interests. This existing 
phenomenon shows the scientific logic in the system of EU institutions. Since 
the Union is a union of states, to transfer parts of the sovereignty to the 
collective authority is truly necessary, and vice versa, the union calls for 
collecting the diverse interests of its membership to guarantee its stability of 
development. Then, the design of the Council is more like a link or so called a 
bridge between the Union and the government in the Member States----in the 
Union, members (exactly the COREPER and government-man) of the Council 
defend the interests deriving from their original states or more exactly the 
requests of their government who sets the national priorities and the casts 
political consideration on their internal competition; at the same time inside the 
states, the ministers who attend the Council may show the people their victory in 
the Council when an act adopted wins largely support by their people, or 
otherwise perform to be sorry and helpless to stop an action taken by that 
European institution in the case that the act attracts domestic critics.  
In the procedure of the legislation in the EU, QMV itself is an essential 
characteristics differentiating EU from other international organizations. Then 
there exists the minority whenever there are negative votes. Thus, not the same 
as ordinary international agreements, acts may pass in the Council without 
consensus and this is a sort of national sovereignty under which circumstances 
national interests must be highlighted during the previous negotiation or there is 
no stage to request it any more on the issues concerned.  
So the Council balances itself due to its nature of a show stage and game 
ground of national interests. 
3. How and where to negotiate to reach a qualified majority?  
The central negotiations take place among the COREPER (Committee of 
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Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States5). The 
COREPER has been divided into two level: COREPERⅠand COREPERⅡ. The 
former one is composed by of deputy permanent representatives, while the latter 
consists of permanent representatives of ambassadors. The tasks differ among 
the two as well. COREPERⅠdeals with “environment, social affairs, the 
internal market and transport”6 and so on. COREPERⅡ is “responsible for 
more sensitive issues, such as economic and financial affairs and external 
relation”.7  
There are 250 working groups of national civil servants assisting the 
COREPER. When a Commission proposal is sent to the Council, it first comes 
before the working groups. After the analysis of the groups, a report would be 
handed over to certain COREPER level indicating which issues have been 
agreed in the groups and which are still calling for discussion in COREPER who 
will examine them and reach to agreements directly.  
Indeed, real negotiations often take place inside at COREPER level in order to 
arrive at a text which is acceptable to all Member States, or at least to enough of 
them to reach a qualified majority when this is provided for.8  
However, the COREPER and its working groups do not meet publicly or they 
achieve an agreement during the lunch time. Besides, “The minutes are not 
published and the COREPER is not accountable to any parliamentary 
assembly”9. Therefore the accountability and transparency are to be challenged 
with COREPER. Since the real “transparency” of the Council should be laid in 
                                                             
5
 Art.16 (7) TEU, Art. 240(1) TFEU 
6
 Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union Law, second edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p74 
7
 Ibid. 
8 Petrus Servatius Renoldus Franciscus, Guide to European Union law : as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010, p.103 
9
 Chalmers, Davies and Monti, European Union Law, second edition, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p75 
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COREPER, by now the true transparency for the Council has not come true. 
 
4. Conclusion for the section 
Although in the Council’s daily decision-making practice, the consensus is the 
common situation among all the members in the Council, 1st November of 2014 
is coming soon. No one can guarantee that under the new rule of voting, the 
consensus situation will still domain, since the cost of passing an act will be 
remarkably lower than before and the rational choice may drive Member States 
to consider the efficiency more than a big happy family. 
However, as far as I am concerned, the effect of deterring of new QMV 
implementation is of much more significance than actually to vote. The trend to 
form majority and minority in a draft act becomes the barging counter in the 
negotiation before the real voting. On one hand, the tough minority could 
threaten to be the blocking minority when vote if their interests cannot be 
satisfied. On the other hand, the weak minority are afraid to be isolated so that 
they either draw their swaying counterparts by promising to exchange their 
support in another draft act which is more benefit for the latter; or trade their 
supportive votes with the majority Member States for some special offers. 
 So in general, the new innovation of double qualified majority voting may 
not be really implemented in the Council. Its effects are much more laid in the 
phase of pre-vote negotiation, for example it may alter the hardness of the 
Permanente Representatives or the Presidency to collect considerable supportive 
opinions. 
The new QMV system benefits the fulfillment of the Council’s legislative 
function. On one hand, the changes increase the in efficiency of decision-making 
in the Council in theory. On the other hand, it deepens the distinction of EU from 
ordinary international organization, and even dilutes the Council the tone of 
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inter-governmental institution, which makes the Council more like a functional 
organ to provide legislative services for the whole EU. However, if the gray area 
of COREPER negotiation still exist and the Member States are overly full of 
enthusiasm about votes trading, the functional role of the Council can be 
reduced.  
  
 25 / 141 
 
SECTION 2. PRESIDENCY 
Aiming to a greater effectiveness, continuity and consistency decision-making 
in the Council, new rotating Presidency has been modified by the Lisbon Treaty. 
1. Introduction of the new Presidency framework  
1.1 General structure according to the Treaties  
Art. 16 of TEU, as the leading provision on the Council among the Treaties, 
generally offers another innovation, the new Rotating Presidency scheme.  
Referring to Council’s construction, Art.16 TEU rules that the Council shall 
contain different configurations and the Presidency shall chair all the 
configurations (other than Foreign Affairs) by way of rotation. (Art.16 (6), (9) 
TEU).  
However, the details of the construction have been left to Art. 236 of TFEU 
which provides that European Council shall adopt decisions on these two 
detailed parts of construction of the Council.  
Besides the provisions ruling on the Council itself, there are other provisions 
according to Lisbon Treaty helping to build the new framework of the Council 
by ruling on other actors within the EU. 
Firstly, Art.15 TEU creates the permanent president of European Council. As a 
result, the Council’s rotating Presidency framework will no longer include the 
chairing of the European Council as before.  
Secondly, Art.18 (3) rules the chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council by the 
High Representative. That is the sign of divorce of the former General Affairs 
and External Relations Council into two configurations ---- General Affairs 
Council and Foreign Affairs Council. To be continuing, the Council’s rotating 
Presidency loses the chairing power upon Foreign Affairs Council. In addition, 
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on behalf of Art 30(2) TEU, the power to “convene and extraordinary Council 
meeting” belongs to the High Representative, which formerly was within the 
Council presidency. 
Therefore, the rotating presidency of the Council remains its rotating 
characteristics but loses previous presidency power over the European Council 
and the Foreign Affairs Council. 
To be continued, the Euro Group, which is not a formal configuration of the 
Council, has its own president elected by the ministers of Member States where 
the currency is the Euro. That is to say that the rotating presidency of the 
Council does not preside this informal ministerial meeting either. (Art.1 and 
Art .2 of Protocol No. 14) 
1.2 Arrangement of the Presidency list according to Decisions 
Besides the legal basis in the Treaties above, due to Art.236 TFEU, we have 
got several Decisions prescribing the details on structure of the Council. For 
instance, European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on the exercise of the 
Presidency of the Council (2009/882/EU) and then Council Decision of 1 
December 2009 (2009/908/EU).  
In the two Decisions above, the Presidency of the Council, with the exception 
of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall be held by pre-established groups of 
three Member States for a period of 18 months. And as the meanwhile “each 
member of a group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all configurations 
of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration.” (Art. 
1(2) of European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (2009/882/EU))  
The principle to make up the groups is on basis of equal rotation among the 
Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical balance 
within the Union. (Art.1(1) of European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 
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(2009/882/EU)). 
The method of settling the group of rotation presidency and its order lays 
down to the negotiation in the IGC before Lisbon Treaty and the following 
“pre-established groups of three Member States” which has been arranged in 
“Council Decision of 1 January 2007 determining the order in which the office 
of President of the Council shall be held (2007/5/EC, Euratom)” and has been 
reconfirmed in Annex I to Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (See Box 2).  
Box 2. List of rotating Presidency of the Council 
Germany January - June 2007 
Portugal July - December 2007 
Slovenia January - June 2008 
France July - December 2008 
Czech Republic January - June 2009 
Sweden July - December 2009 
Spain January - June 2010 
Belgium July - December 2010 
Hungary January - June 2011 
Poland July - December 2011 
Denmark January - June 2012 
Cyprus July - December 2012 
Ireland January - June 2013 
Lithuania July - December 2013 
Greece January - June 2014 
Italy July - December 2014 
Latvia January - June 2015 
Luxembourg July - December 2015 
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Netherlands January - June 2016 
Slovakia July - December 2016 
Malta January - June 2017 
United Kingdom July - December 2017 
Estonia January - June 2018 
Bulgaria July - December 2018 
Austria January - June 2019 
Romania July - December 2019 
Finland January - June 2020 
 
To examine the list of the rotation, within the recent years from the beginning 
of rotating presidency after the coming into force of Lisbon Treaty, there is no 
larger Member States in the groups of presidencies, except for Poland in the 
second half of 2011, which was ever assumed to dilute the “risk overshadowing 
the rise of the two new ‘institutional’ presidencies” 10(the European Council 
Presidency and the Council Presidency) and now proved to be a successful 
Presidency.  
In this case, the two new born actors of EU ---- President of European Council 
and High Representative----may work on their position, at least in early years of 
power growing and the transitional phase of the Treaties, in a relative 
concentrated way without overwhelming pressure coming from the rotating 
Presidency.  
 
1.3 Chairing the configurations and the preparatory bodies thereof within 
                                                             
10
 Joint study of CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, The Treaty of Lisbon: a second look at the 
institutional innovations, September 2010, p.72 
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the Council 
Firstly, according to Art.16 TEU, the rotating Presidency in the Council chairs 
nine out of ten configurations, except for Foreign Affairs Council. Mentioning 
about the configurations in the Council, Lisbon Treaty has given a design to 
separate General Affairs and External Relations Council into two and only 
General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council have been settled directly 
by the Treaties (Art.16 (6) TEU). The pre-existing list of the configurations was 
ruled in Annex I of Council Decision of 15 September 2006 adopting the 
Council's Rules of Procedure (2006/683/EC, Euratom) which has been latest 
published on 1 January 2009 (see Box 3.). Now, under Art.16 TEU and Art. 236 
TFEU, the amendment of these configurations, other than General Affairs 
Council and Foreign Affairs Council, calls for the decision of European Council 
by QMV. 
 
Secondly, by European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (2009/882/EU) 
the presidency shall chair over the preparatory bodies, other than the ones of 
Box 3.LIST OF COUNCIL CONFIGURATIONS 
1. General affairs; 
2. Foreign affairs;
1
 
3. Economic and financial affairs; 
4. Justice and home affairs; 
5. Employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs; 
6. Competitiveness (internal market, industry and research); 
7. Transport, telecommunications and energy; 
8. Agriculture and fisheries; 
9. Environment; 
10. Education, youth and culture. 
 
1
 After Lisbon Treaty, General Affairs and External Relations Council has 
been divided into two configurations: General Affairs Council and Foreign 
Affairs Council. 
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Foreign Affairs Council. At the meantime, Annex II to Council Decision of 1 
December 2009 (2009/908/EU arranges the chairing of almost all the key 
preparatory bodies of the Foreign Affairs Council to representative of the High 
Representative. Then the rotating Presidency transfers the chairing of these 
categories of preparatory bodies to the outside world of its own working 
schedule. 
Article 2 of European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (2009/882/EU) 
provides that “the Committee of Permanent Representative of the Governments 
of the Member States shall be chaired by a representative of the Member State 
chairing the General Affairs Council.” So, the COREPER is still under 
supervision of the rotating Presidency, as mentioned in “How and where to 
negotiate to reach a qualified majority” of this paper, which plays a key role in 
examining the proposals and negotiation during the procedure of legislation 
which now is the key character of the Council. It is notable that although the 
affairs referring to CFSP mainly fall within the task of the High Representative 
and the EEAS, since the COREPER II still plays the important role of 
negociation on vital decisions and horizontal affairs, “this allows the rotating 
chair to exert its influence over the preparations of the Foreign Affairs Council 
meetings.”11 
Thus, the functional role of the presidency will be made full use inside the 
legislative institution on an essential level. 
2. Influence by the changes of the new presidency 
2.1 Internal effects 
The rotation is not a consequence of collective leadership. Though there are 
                                                             
11 Szabo, Background vocals: What role for the rotating presidency in the EU’s external 
relations post-Lisbon? Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, EU 
Diplomacy Papers, May 2011, p.9 
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groups on the list of rotation, which each contains three Member States each 
time, it is cooperation rather than transformation to a collective leadership. Until 
now, the first and the second Trio had not practiced to share all the 18 months. 
Since each Member States has a duty or a power to chair all the configurations 
for six months, the other two in the membership in the 18-months presidency 
group “ ‘assist’ the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis of a common 
program”(Art.1(2) European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 
(2009/882/EU)). And at the same time, it is a real collective cooperation scheme 
under which the Presidential Trio makes decisions and implements on the 
requirements of continuity and consistency in a relative long term of 18 months.  
For the detailed constituent and responsibility have not been codified in any 
legal instrument, the presidency Member States are contributing to the sample 
establishment. In practice, the members of the Presidency Trio have learned to 
cooperate and the civil servants from the three countries shall assist each other.  
For example, one and a half years before the beginning of the first Trio after 
Lisbon Treaty, Spain, Belgium and Hungary started to draft the Trio program 
which resulted in a detailed document and later the final document of a strategic 
frame work and an operational program containing the Trio’s priorities and so 
on12. As the same, also from 2008, the cooperation of the second Trio member 
states has been launched. 
Both of the two Trio came into a “joint Presidency program” at the end of 
their preparatory period. It ought to be a good sign of cooperation and 
consistency of Trio Presidency. Unfortunately, once the formal term of 
Presidency began, “the perceived utility and salience of the joint program 
declined.”13 The reason was that it was too long from drafting the joint program 
                                                             
12
 Beke, Review of the Belgian rotating presidency: from political to administrative leadership), 
SIEPS, 27/1/2011, p.49 
13
 Batory and Puetter, Consistency and diversity? The EU’s rotating trio Council Presidency 
after the Lisbon Treaty, Journal of European Public Policy, 20:1 January 2013, p104 
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to the third rotating Member State to start its term, which seemed to be outdated 
for the actual EU’s priorities.  
One crucial question lays in the changes and reformation in General Affairs 
Council.  
The chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies have been fixed by Annex III 
to Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (2009/908/EU). However, until now, 
the scheme of chairpersons in the Council configurations, especially General 
Affairs Council, has not been fixed like the preparatory bodies. According to 
existing legislation, Council Decision of 15 September 2006 adopting the 
Council's Rules of Procedure (latest published on 1 January 2009), it is for each 
Member State to determine the way in which it is represented in the Council, in 
accordance with Article 203 of the EC Treaty14; in the case of the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council, each government shall be represented at 
the different meetings of this configuration by the Minister or State Secretary of 
its choice, without saying which kind or level of Minister or State Secretary, vice 
or not, high or low ranking, Prime Minister or not, which may leave a vacuum 
for the coordination inside Council or between institutions. 
Before Lisbon Treaty, most of the cases were that it was each Foreign Minister 
who attended the General Affairs and External Relations Council. Since the 
Foreign Affairs Council has been set as a separate configuration by Lisbon 
Treaty, Foreign Ministers of the Member States started to rarely attend the 
General Affairs Council. Instead, they fix their primary focus on matters in 
Foreign Affairs Council and “often delegate participation in the General Affairs 
Council to their deputies, state secretaries for European affairs, or even their 
permanent representatives”15.  
                                                             
14 Article 203 EC has been repealed by Article 2, paragraph 190 of Lisbon Treaty. 
15
 Kaczynski and Byrne, The General Affairs Council: the key to political influence of rotating 
presidencies , CEPS, No. 246, July 2011, p.3 
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As far as situations on the rotating Presidencies after Lisbon Treaty, all of 
these presidency Member States have had their prime ministers or foreign 
ministers chair the Council presidency, which has not risked the functioning of 
rotating Presidency. However, until there is the legislative rule fixing the 
chairperson, discussions are necessary to avoid any negative impact on rotating 
presidency. Firstly, the participating membership instead of the Foreign 
Ministers don’t have much experience of running the affairs in such a significant 
configuration which is the key preparatory role of European Council and the 
main actor in the horizontal coordination within the Council.  
More exactly, due to the low ranking of these participants, “coordinating 
policy initiatives falling across several Council formations, since most of the 
other formations that the General Affairs Council would seek to coordinate are 
made up of more senior ministers”16. Although in fact within the Council’s 
working practice it is the COREPER undertakes the coordination, it is a big 
question that in principle “coordination” should be the task of General Affairs 
Council. As a result, the rotating Presidency of the Council needs the General 
Affairs Council to be functional, at least to strengthen the political significance 
of the rotating Presidency itself.  
The reformation is bound to be necessary. One of the possible solutions may 
be that “the rotating Presidency should have the opportunity for their prime 
minister or president to assume the chair of the General Affairs Council.”17 This 
solution could absolutely encourage all the other Member States to send higher 
ranking membership participating in General Affairs Council. Though we would 
have a more powerful configuration or even a more important institution, the 
faces on the rotating Presidency chairs will be observed again around the table in 
European Council. The double role may confuse the role of the Council between 
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 Kaczynski and Byrne, The General Affairs Council: the key to political influence of rotating 
presidencies , CEPS, No. 246, July 2011,p.3 
17Ibid., p.4 
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a legislative one and a political one. Maybe it would be better to adopt a rule of 
fixing the chairpersons of the General Affairs Council strictly to the Ministers, 
forbidding delegating the participation to deputy or permanent representatives of 
the Ministers. 
2.2 Inter-institutional effects  
As the general observation above shows, the presidency of the Council will 
execute a role as the head of a legislative institution and as an associate with 
other institutions. And it “exchanged its former political and institutional role for 
a functional one, which might appear more prosaic, but is not insignificant.”18 
2.2.1 General review of EU external representation after Lisbon Treaty 
Firstly, we had better to recall the situations before Lisbon Treaty.  
Article 4 of TEU of the version of Nice Treaty gave the Rotating Presidency 
of the Council the power to chair the European Council; article 18(1) of the 
same version of the Treaty codified that the Presidency (of the Council)shall 
represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security 
policy; last but not the least, article 24 of that Treaty conferred on the Council 
the power to authorize its Presidency, although assisted by the Commission as 
appropriate, to open negotiations of the agreements with one or more States or 
international organizations in implementation of common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP). In general, the old story was that the Council, or more exactly its 
Presidency, was one of the key players of the Union at the international stage, 
while the Commission had played a technical role on specific issues.  
At present, on behalf of the entering into force of Lisbon Treaty, the Council 
has been suffering of losing both the chairmanship of the European Council and 
representing the Union at any level. The creation of President of European 
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 Joint study of CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, The Treaty of Lisbon: a second look at the 
institutional innovations, September 2010, p.72 
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Council shows to the outside world that EU has a unified representative at the 
highest CFSP level from now on, and he/she is the permanent actor in 
international scene (Art. 15(6) TEU); the EU’s “foreign minister”, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall 
represent the Union on CFSP matters to conduct dialogue and express position 
on EU’s behalf, which can be understood as a specific dealer on CFSP 
comparing with the President of European Council (Art. 27(2) TEU); the 
Commission shall ensure the Union’s external representation with the exception 
of CFSP in general, which is always the institution dealing with high political 
but specific questions on the Union’s part  (Art. 17(1)TEU); the Union 
delegations, which are belongs to the system of European External Action 
Service (EEAS), shall represent the Union in third countries and at international 
organizations (Art. 221(1) TFEU).  
As the consequence, there is no vacancy for the Council or its Presidency to 
represent EU externally in the primary law, which each actor concerning of the 
EU representation mentioned above has relatively clarified competence.  
Therefore we can observe for instance that President Van Rompuy and 
Commission President Barroso were together as the EU’s representation in G20; 
and also it was them who were appearing at the official meeting with the head of 
China in February 2012 in Beijing. The former represents the foreign policy’s 
part and would shake hands firstly with heads of third countries, while the latter 
deals with the topics on trade and economic questions.  
 
On the part of international agreement negotiation, the Council can never 
authorize its Rotating Presidency to undertake the task. Although the provisional 
expression is for the Council to nominate the Union negotiator or the head of the 
Union’s negotiating team, regularly the Council chooses from the Commission 
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and the High Representative to open the negotiation, due to the discretion of the 
Council on the sort of subject policy concerned. According to Art. 218(3) TFEU, 
the Commission would be nominated as the negotiator on the subject matters 
other than CFSP which is the competence of the High Representative’s.  
In keeping with the previous versions of Treaty, Lisbon Treaty maintains the 
“special committee” composed of representatives from Member States in 
consultation when the negotiations are conducted (Art. 218(4) TFEU). The 
Commission or the High Representative shall consult this special committee 
constantly. 
In practice, the content of the negotiation on the Union’s position is not far 
reaching out of the Recommendations handed over by the Commission or the 
High Representative before the negotiator’s nomination by the Council. During 
the negotiation, the special committee meets the negotiator quite regularly. 
Although, the special committee can not intervene in the conduct of the 
negotiation directly, or it cannot be understood as the double negotiator, the 
members of the committee often mediate and define a balance point among the 
Member States and also between the Member States and the third parties.19 
Therefore, the general position of the Council would not be ignored in the 
negotiation though there is no normal role for the Council; otherwise the 
agreements envisaged cannot be approved by the Ministers at the first phase 
within the EU legislative procedure thereinafter. 
There is another type of situation when the subject matters of the international 
agreements are within the policies of shared competence for the EU and its 
Member States.  
The primary law does not confer the negotiating power upon the Member 
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 Baroncini, L’Unione Europea e la procedura di conclusione degli accordi internationali dopo 
il Trattato di Lisbona, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Marzo 2013), Vol. 5, Nº 1, pp. 
5-37, p.9 
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States, nor can the Article 218 of TFEU be interpreted as binomial negotiators to 
the Commission or the High Representative and the representative of the 
Council (like the Rotating Presidency). Furthermore, the Commission should 
definitely not negotiate on the Union’s part as well as on the behalf of the 
Member States.  
This problem came up during the negotiation of the Minamata Convention on 
Mercury. In May of 2010, the COREPER proposed to the Council to adopt a 
“hybrid act” to solve the question by authorize both the Commission and the 
Rotating Presidency in the negotiation concerning the policies of shared 
competence. The Commission was arguing the incompatibility with the Treaties. 
As a resolution and also a compromise, the Council adopted Decision 16632/10 
addressed to the Commission: “to the extent that the subject matter of the 
agreement falls within the shared competence of the Union and of its Member 
States, the Commission and the Member States should cooperate closely during 
the negotiating process, with a view to aiming for unity in the international 
representation of the Union and its Member States”. (Council Decision 16632/10, 
article 1(3))  
In this way, the sample might be set that the representatives of the Member 
States would stand at the back of the Commission following the duty of loyal 
cooperation to ensure the unity in the international representation of the Union.20 
In practice, during the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), “the European Commission, which was responsible for conducting the 
negotiations, with the participation of the Presidency of the Council for matters 
under Member States' competence.”21  
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2.2.2 Relation with the President of European Council 
Since the highest political function has been transferred to European Council 
and there seats now a permanent President, political negotiation shall mostly 
take place there and the Council does not hold in hands the process of command 
operating anymore. The fact of emerging the permanent President shall not be 
reversible, but the best way is to learn fast how to associate with Mr. President.  
According to Art.15(6)(b) TEU, for the preparations for the work of European 
Council, the President of the European Council and the General Affairs Council 
(chaired by the rotating presidency of the Council) are on equal footing. That is 
to say that although to preside the European Council has become an old story for 
the rotating presidency, the rotating presidency still can influence the 
agenda-setting when prepare for the meeting of the European Council. And the 
logic of this association is that “the rotating Presidency retains full responsibility 
for the smooth operation of all Council configurations, apart from the Foreign 
Affairs Council, and that the smooth functioning of the European Council 
depends in large part on the functioning of the Council themselves”22. 
And in practice, at the early time of the new presidency “President Van 
Rompuy and the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero were asked to prepare 
together the Union’s position for the G20 meeting in Toronto on strengthening 
global financial discipline. Similarly, the six-month Presidency was associated 
ex officio with the remit to President Van Rompuy to improve economic 
governance.23”  
Most successful was the situation of Belgian Presidency in 2010. As the 
fellow citizen of President Van Rompuy, the prime minister of Belgium acted 
supportively. As to the experience of Polish Presidency in the second half of year 
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 Joint study of CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, The Treaty of Lisbon: a second look at the 
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 Ibid, p.71 
 39 / 141 
 
2011, Prime Minister Tusk and President Van Rompuy “were known to be 
conciliators and accommodating other perspectives. … Herman Van Rompuy’s 
main task was the situation in the Eurozone, while Prime Minister Tusk focused 
on all other elements”24 to lessen the burden of the former.  As well as the 
other teamers in the second Trio, Denmark and Cyprus, “have supported the 
permanent chair holders and consequently no significant complications have 
occurred so far.”25 
In fact, both from the TEU provisions and the practice, the agenda-setting 
power of the European Council is quite forceful. Art.15 (1) TEU defines its 
function that “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and 
priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.” Though without 
legislative functions, the European Council sets the general priorities and 
thereafter the agenda for certain piece of legislation.  
From President Van Rompuy came into the office, the European Council has 
been very active and they regular meet at least three times a semester. Especially 
the Lisbon Treaty came into force when the EU was exactly suffering the crisis. 
The high political forum has become more necessary in the crisis like a scheme 
dealing with emergency in order to seek effective solutions as soon as possible. 
In this light, the Council has to wait for the general deal achieved among the 
heads of Member States. Once there comes the framework agreement, the 
legislative task begins to walk into the workload of the Council.  
For instance, the EU budget originally belongs to the business of the Council 
and the European Parliament. However, due to a lack of largely satisfactory draft 
act for the EU Multiannual Financial Framework from 2014, the crucial 
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p.55 
25
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negotiation happened in the European Council first. The Heads of government or 
states bargained the contribution of each Member States and each section of the 
budget as well, which would be the framework for the final legislative act 
adopted by the co-legislatures.  
Other than the top issues in the EU, the Council can follow its own agenda 
setting by the Rotating Presidency or the Trio Presidency. For example, in the 
second Trio Presidency after Lisbon Treaty, President Van Rompuy dealt with 
Euro crisis while the Rotating Presidency worked on eastern partnership and so 
on.  
The Council after Lisbon Treaty plays out to be the operation room for a giant 
factory which focuses on processing the draft act, which may probably be in the 
light of framework ideas by politicians in the European Council, by negotiations 
at low political or technical level to be legitimacy. But the Council is absolutely 
not the deputy of Presidency of European Council. Low politics does not mean 
“no politics”. The design by Lisbon Treaty, which separates so much clearly than 
ever before the main political role and legislative functional role between the 
European Council and the Council, tends to attract the severe political 
competition mainly into the European Council and ease the ministers from the 
hotpot to concentrate on concrete legislative pieces. Only through the 
accomplishment of the Council’s legislative function, the policy can become law.  
To this extent, decision-making at a whole view would be more efficient on 
one hand; on the other, the legislative function and the accountability of the 
Council have been better perfected by waving off the high political role or at 
least by a consequence of collective decision rather than by individual 
politicians.  
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2.2.3 Relation with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy 
Art. 2(5) of Council Decision of 1 December 2009 (2009/937/EU) Annex 
“Rules of procedure of the Council” states that “the High Representative…who 
may, where necessary, ask to be replaced by the member of that configuration 
representing the Member State holding the six-monthly presidency of the 
Council”. That is the delegated power which the representative of rotating 
presidency may execute in the foreign affair field in the favor of EU.  
The High Representative (now is Ms. Ashton) as a new official post assisted 
by EEAS, her workload is heavy and the EEAS is in the process of establishing 
and improvement, which Ms. Ashton and her team do not easily cope with such 
critical section of EU policies. The Council had the experience chairing the 
business on CFSP before. Either for the transitional period for the new 
distributing functions between the High Representative and the Council after 
Lisbon Treaty or for the better accomplishment on EU CFSP, it is without doubt 
that the Council Presidency is considerably qualified to be delegated when 
necessary.  
The practice of this delegated power first happened within the Spanish 
Presidency that “the French minister represented HR Ashton at a conference in 
Montreal on aid for Haiti”26. The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Janos 
Martonyi “has replaced the High Representative on 14 different occasions during 
international meetings when Ms. Ashton was not able to participate.”27 When 
turning to Polish Presidency, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski chose to act as 
a loyalist to the High Representative. “He represented the Union not only in 
official meetings, but on official trips as well. He has been on a policy trip to 
                                                             
26
 Joint study of CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, The Treaty of Lisbon: a second look at the 
institutional innovations, September 2010, p.71 
27
 Kaczynski, Polish Council Presidency 2011: Ambitions and Limitations, SIEPS, 2011:op, 
p.56 
 42 / 141 
 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in that capacity, and on another occasion also to 
Libya.”28 
In general, the cooperation between the presidency of the Council and the 
European Council or the High Representative is not only for the purpose of 
continuity and cohesion at institutional level, but also a method through which 
the rotating presidency restores its lost power in the Lisbon Treaty. By dividing 
functions and responsibilities between the Council and the above mentioned 
actors, the Council’s function has been emphasized on the EU internal managing, 
which makes the Council’s legislative function prominent. 
3. Case study ---- practice of the new rotating presidency 
To examine the practice of the new rotating Presidency in the Council is a 
research of dynamic. Here takes Belgium and Poland as case study. 
3.1 Belgium in the First Trio  
Though started to prepare very early for the presidencies, the first Trio played 
a more transitional and administrative role. The outstanding performance was by 
Belgium, while Spain and Hungary were low-profiled. 
Before Belgium took the chair in the rotating presidency, Spanish presidency 
did not achieve as a good starter for this new system. Spanish domestic situation 
was optimistic and stable. However, “after the first few weeks, Prime Minister 
Zapatero appeared detached to the outside world. This did not help the Spaniards 
in coordinating Presidency meetings”29. And Spain seemed not willing to pass 
the power to the president of European Council. The task of implementing the 
Lisbon Treaty to fulfill the obligation actively had been left to Belgium which 
was in the second turn thereafter.     
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Fortunately, Belgium has set a better sample. Firstly, known as an advocate of 
European integration, “Belgium is not only more maximalist than Spain’s, but 
also different from the one Hungary seems to have in mind”30, while Spain and 
Hungary are the group mates in the rotation. Belgian Presidency took its 
independent efforts to “full implementation of the Lisbon treaty and the 
realization of legislative output”31.  
Secondly, Belgian rotating Presidency deals with the institutional relations. 
The first rotating Presidency was Spain and it did not want pass its former power 
to the new permanent President of the European Union. As the first Rotating 
Presidency after Lisbon Treaty, Spain has undergone the bitter feeling of witness 
the permanent Presidency of European Council to undertake the competence 
which had been the Rotating Presidency’s cup of tea. The mass media in Spain 
revealed this ironic tone that “Essentially, Zapatero’s competences will be the 
same as those of the preceding ‘rotating’ Presidents with the exception that the 
Belgian will preside over all summits with the Spaniard on his side, according to 
the compromise adopted by both.”32 When times came to Belgian Presidency, 
Belgium naturally supported the permanent one not only because Mr. Van 
Rompuy is a national of Belgium, but also due to the domestic power vacuum 
which did not challenge the permanent Presidency or the High Representative 
where the government of Belgium at that time was a caretaker one resulting 
from the failure of forming a new government by election. An additional act, 
unlike its peer of Spain, was to make the High Representative a top priority to 
overcome any ambiguity on the EU’s external representation and to support the 
High Representative in the challenging task of creating the External Action 
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Service.33 
Last but not least, Belgium avoided the influence coming from its own 
domestic society. At the early days of Belgian Presidency, the internal difficulty 
of government changing resulted from the coalition parties losing significant 
support. The government changing had invoked doubt whether it would delay 
the decision-making in the rotating presidency in the Council, because in 
Belgium the cabinets belonged to the former national government who were the 
experts and “spiders” in the presidency web would be “replaced by new political 
appointees without much knowledge of the ongoing agenda”34due to the national 
political changing. Proved by facts, “Belgium was able to force breakthroughs 
and to manage severe crises. It seems to be a tradition that Belgium, as a small 
and pro-integration member state, often chooses to serve European goals rather 
than to defend its own interest. And it has no tradition of pushing hard for its 
own interests, but opts instead for supporting the common European interest”35. 
Belgium is a role as an advocator, but it is not always the case that other rotating 
Presidency Member States will do the same. Thus, the internal affair may 
probably affect the fulfilling of the Presidency. 
However, Belgium has not set a blueprint of a typical Presidency. Though the 
chairing person of the rotating Presidency should have been the Prime Minister 
of Belgium, that person was one of the ministers in the government of former 
Prime Minister Van Rompuy. Second, chairing person was in a caretaker 
government who had a limited competence of administration, which had no 
power to challenge the permanent President of European Council.36  
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3.2 Poland in the second Trio  
Poland was undoubtedly the most powerful member in the second Trio of 
rotating Presidencies. Not because of its size of the country, but also for its 
ambition to become a heavyweight Member State in EU even though as one of 
the newer Member States. So as to its political ambition, before Polish 
Presidency, Mr. Mike Beke in his article predicted Poland might exercise a 
stronger political approach and challenge the role of the permanent President of 
European Council and of the High Representative.37 In reality, Poland has 
performed much better than expected. 
Above all, the government has been sang high praise widely for the long-time 
preparation on its presidency. Poland started to prepare for the Presidency since 
2008. And one year before its turn, the entire Polish cabinet visited to Brussels in 
order to get known in advance. Then it “started with a tremendous cultural and 
political offensive with widely praised exhibitions across Europe, and a very 
well received speech on the EUs challenges in the European Parliament by 
Prime Minister Tusk”38. These activities helped Poland to go really smoothly at 
the beginning of its first time rotation. 
Secondly, similarly as Belgium, “few national priorities have been pushed 
forward during the Polish Presidency”39. A national election in the mid-term of 
Polish Presidency has not distracted it from running a satisfactory Presidency. 
Better than Belgium, the parliamentary election was not out of the anticipation 
of people without changing the political situation in Poland, which helped to 
ease the possible impact coming from domestic aspect. 
Furthermore, even outside the Eurozone, Poland set its priorities firstly on 
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economic growth of EU and treated European integration as a source of growth. 
However, the traditional giants in European Union was not waiting for their 
turns in the Presidency list quietly, but by exerting their impact in the Euro 
Group , since the integration of the Europe is still much more leaning to the 
economic (monetary) phase. Poland was very active to participate in dealing 
with the euro crisis, but finally “was not even invited to the extraordinary 
summit of the heads of state of governments of the Eurozone members of 21 
July 2011.” 40  The reason was simply because “while other members of 
Eurozone would to support the Polish Presidency to help in the adoption of 
‘Stability and Growth Pact’, France vetoed the participation of Poland’s Finance 
Minister in the Euro Group meetings.” 41 Therefore, Poland turned to operate 
on other aspects, sincerely supporting President Van Rompuy dealing with the 
euro crisis, without neither challenging the permanent President nor becoming 
inactive. And also, the breakthrough in Euro zone actually lays in Germany and 
France. Mentioning these two greater powers, Poland was willing to cooperate 
with them, since closer relationship with greater powers within the member state 
of EU helps Poland to further grow its influence. Simultaneously, Germany and 
France require the support coming from Poland which is the eighth largest 
country and sixth most populated member state of EU, and is Germany’s most 
important eastern trading partner after Polish membership of EU, also has the 
frontier with Ukraine (the largest country in the eastern Europe), last but not 
least, Poland was one of the few EU countries which have had positive economy 
growth during the difficult time for EU. Besides, Poland and other non-euro 
member states are waiting for the stability of Euro to intend to adopt the 
currency of Euro. It can be imagined therefore that it will be a win-win situation 
if Poland, as a powerful economy, becomes the member state of Euro Zone.  
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Fourth, on the frontier of the eastern border of EU, Poland has held the strong 
will to act as an honest broker both in the free trade areas covered by Eastern 
Partnership and eastern enlargement of Schengen. Even following the veto to 
Schengen enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria during September 2011 in 
Justice and Home Affairs Council, Polish Presidency was still seeking to find a 
solution on the level of European Council.42 
Last but not least, as mentioned in paragraphs of 1.2.2.1 and 1.2.2.2 above, 
Polish Presidency set a good sample of cooperation with the EU actors 
(President of European Council and the High Representative). Although Poland 
was unable to work out in the issue of euro crisis, its administrative role was 
impressive. 
Although the some certain issues (e.g. economic crisis, enlargement of 
Schengen area) have not achieved at settled-down level in just six-month long 
Polish presidency, Poland has proved that her leaders and nationals are mostly 
positive towards Europeanization and also her desire to get involved deeper into 
the EU issues is benefit for both Poland’s and EU’s growth. Polish Presidency 
has indeed severed the aim of building her heavyweight in EU. More 
significantly, as one of the most pro-European Member States, Poland gives EU 
a great chance of growth in its competence. Polish presidency is rather a good 
beginning than an end of the Poland’s performance as a rapidly growing entity. 
3.3 Non-closed assessment of the third Trio 
Before the conclusion of this section, for the time being, I would like to write 
down some non-closed assessment for the third Trio before its very end. 
The third Trio began from January of 2013, lasting until June of 2014, 
composing Ireland, Lithuania and Greece. Comparing with the first two Trios, 
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this team seems to be less powerful from political or economic influence. In an 
overall view, within the third Trio, by now, the most significant remark is the 
adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20 (MFF) in December 
of 2013. Whereas, the MFF had been negotiated between the Council and 
European Parliament for two and a half years, which cannot be counted to the 
unique effort made by the third Trio.  
In the mid-term of the Irish presidency, the chairman of the General Affairs 
Council complained about the absence of representatives from European 
Parliament for the negotiation with the Council. By stating the good faith of the 
Council itself, the chairman expressed regret for the uncooperative position of 
European Parliament at that moment. As far as the agreement reach within the 
European Council in February 2013, the Council was facing an optimal 
perspective by wiping out obstacle from Member States on behalf of the general 
mandate43from the former. However, the European Parliament seemed to be the 
tough stone on the way from the view of Irish presidency. The chairman strongly 
suggested the European Parliament not to combine the MFF together with the 
amending annual budget of 2013, and the Council itself had behaved quite 
cooperative for the communication with the former. By stressing the negotiation 
on the MFF should run in parallel with the amending budget 2013, the Council 
illustrated its innocent for the possible fruitless or delayed negotiation with the 
European Parliament. 
Lithuania became membership of EU in 2004. It was the first time for it to 
take the turn as rotating presidency from July to December of 2013. This Balitic 
sea country was demonstrating its sincerity to be involved in EU affairs. As an 
eastern European country, just like Poland, Lithuania willed to show its 
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supportive gesture to the EU rather than the historical influence from Russia. 
The main intention of Lithuania can be considered as promoting its national 
culture, economy and being well known by the rest in the Union. As the same 
with Poland’s situation mentioned above in the case study, Lithuania was out of 
the decision-making center of Euro Group, but set such as Eastern Partnership 
and regional cooperation in Baltic region as the ones of the key priorities. To this 
extent, Lithuania was more or less the same role as Poland who winded away 
from euro crisis but to contribute to the eastern neighborhood policy of EU and 
to “strengthen its position in the EU as a reliable Member State”44. 
Greece took over the torch from January 2014. Although Greece intended to 
“promote the idea that the country is an equal partner in the EU system of 
governance” 45 , its presidency has been anticipated as “cannot be the 
standard-bearer for a pro-European message”46. This is not only because that it 
has been in the swirl of euro crisis for a considerable time, but also for its poor 
leadership resulting from internal political and social implosion. 
For the running of office as rotating presidency, Greece would cost 50 
million euros. Although this presidency budget was pretty lower than that of 
Ireland (60 million euros), the amount of money seemed to be a burden where 
the Greek government is facing with more than 300 billion worth of debt47. 
German had stressed that Greece should resign from its rotating presidency. 
Nevertheless Greek presidency came into office on schedule. Due to the low 
amount of the presidency budget, the Greek government has to employ no more 
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than 150 employees, and “the Office of the Greek Presidency employs a total of 
27 people to meet the needs of the presidency concerning the planning, 
coordination and promotion of all activities at national the European level 
during its tenure” 48 . Furthermore, the staff secondments supporting the 
operation of Permanent Representation’s office took place without always using 
the appropriate selection procedure 49 . Besides, as a coincidence, the 
parliamentary and regional election will be held in May 2014 when will be also 
the election period for European Parliament (EP8). In this sense, EU legislative 
activity will be actually just last for three months before April, which has 
shortened the legislative period for Greek Council presidency, on one side; 
Greece cannot provide strong leadership due to its internal political situation 
from the point of view of Doctor Filippa Chatzistavrou in her article50 on the 
another side. For the trapped economy, Germany, as the main contributor for 
rescuing Greek crisis, “was excluding any discussion about the haircut of some 
official debt obligations and postpones potential negotiations about the 
reduction of interest rates on aid loans and/or the substantial extension of the 
period of their repayment until after the EP election, thereby elimination any 
chance for Greece to open this discussion and outline possible trade-offs during 
the presidency tenure” 51 . In addition, together with highest rate of 
unemployment in EU, Greece’s status cannot help to promote public confidence 
for its rotating presidency. However, maybe it is too early to be pessimistic at 
present. In the program of Greek rotating presidency, it is ambitious that 
employment, maritime policy, migration policy and integration of Euro zone 
were listed in the priorities. One can only draw the conclusion when time goes 
to the very end of Greek rotating presidency. In any way, Greece and Greek 
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people have set a sincere sample to undertake their own duty to run for office in 
the EU even if they are struggling for their own life.  
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4. Conclusion for the section 
According to the presidency practice until Greece, we may draw conclusion 
as following. 
Firstly, the time of membership of EU (old or new membership) does not 
matter the achievement. Spain, Belgium and Denmark have relatively long 
history of membership, while Hungary, Poland and Cyprus are new ones due to 
the recent years’ enlargement. Situations are differ from the national desires that 
the ones, who link the well development of the Union to its own improvement 
or who consider a good presidency as a chance to get known and better 
involved, may most likely to dedicate themselves to the Union’s issue.. 
 Secondly, national political stability does not decisively impact the process 
of rotation in the Council either. Belgium held the chairmanship in the Council 
while its national government was just a caretaker one. Poland was running her 
presidency in the Council together with her national election in the middle term 
of presidency. Even worse, Cyprus was facing a really fragile national economy, 
a sudden forced bailout package to salvage its ailing banking system and long 
lasting complicated controversy with Turkey. However, these member states 
have played out satisfactory presidency. On the contrary, Spain and Hungary had 
relatively stable internal politics, which did not result in diligent chairmanship. 
Thirdly, neighborhood relationship and policy may influence the priorities of 
rotating presidency agenda. For instance, priorities set by Poland represented the 
topics of vital importance also for her neighborhood Romania.52 In addition, the 
geopolitics also could result in policy tilt, which can be proved by the Poland’s 
efforts in the free trade areas covered by Eastern Partnership and eastern 
enlargement of Schengen. 
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Furthermore, high level chairperson shall lead to greater coordination ability 
and political appeal with the precondition of active performance. Vice versa, 
passive high level chairmanship depresses the confidence both in the public and 
institutions. Nevertheless, the same faces appearing in different institutions, the 
Council and the European Council may confuse to the outside world between the 
roles of legislature and political negotiator. Whereas, until the adoption acts on 
fixed chairpersons of the Council configurations, any attempt thereof is worth 
testing and is the valuable experience for the future legislation. 
Last but not the least, there calls for a high level coordination system or 
authority for the participation or involvement of the rotating presidency when 
not all the member states are concerned in certain issues, especially the Euro 
Zone issue. In practice, Poland and Denmark are not members of Euro Group 
and were not able to have a word in the meeting of the latter. Cyprus is the 
membership of Euro Group but itself was the object of the meeting dealing with 
Euro crisis. Moreover, the largest Member States, Germany, France and Great 
Britain “have eclipsed the potential influence of the Council presidency”53. At 
present time, it is of low possibility for “the small and new Member State 
Presidency to accomplish, other than keeping bread-and-butter issues on the 
right track and achieving a few minor ‘priorities’”54. Euro crisis has a close link 
to the future of EU as a whole. As one of the legislatures, the Council shall be 
involved at the presidency level into the issues dealing with the crisis at least to 
guarantee the multiannual finical framework and effective horizontal 
coordination. There are 10 member states which are not the members of Euro 
Zone. As a result, in the following presidency in the Council, it is necessary to 
build a bridge dealing with the relation between existing legislation and practical 
needs.  
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By now, the only constraint on active presidency practice is the reputation. It 
is the internal determinant to realize the importance of interdependence between 
member states and EU, as the case of Poland that “without the EU and European 
solidarity Poland would not now be a prosperous country and without a Polish 
EU presidency the word ‘solidarity’ would not have quite the same meaning”.55 
Obviously, the Council is not the classical community method of EU. Therefore 
a political concern does exist and is inevitable during the rotating presidency. 
And although the Council does not have the competence of proposing, an active 
presidency of it may effectively promote the new proposals by strategic program 
and its implementation. The design of the Presidency Trio is to decrease the 
impact from internal difficulties onto minimum level, with the purpose of 
enhancing the consistency and quality of rotating presidency in order to serve 
the legislative function of the Council. There is more consistency, the more 
legislative function to be displayed. For the presidency Member States 
themselves, rational choice may drive them to present differentiated policy 
direction and priorities due to the state interests, such as internal economy and 
politics, geographic relations and historical culture. To overcome the 
unproportionate domestic input, the Trio Presidency should either share all the 
18 months’ term or meet regularly to adjust the Joint Presidency Program 
according to the varying reality and the political priorities set by the European 
Council. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 RELATION OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE 
COMMISSION 
SECTION 1. NON-MONOPOLY ON PROPOSAL MAKING BY THE 
COMMISSION   
Relations between the Council and the Commission in the legislation aspect 
have changed. The Commission was always the exclusive role of proposal maker. 
While, the Treaty of Lisbon gives other bodies the right to make a proposal. Art 
17(2) TEU, as the leading rule, provides that the task of proposal making in the 
framework of EU legal order mainly lays on the Commission, except where the 
Treaties provide otherwise. After analyzing the provisions in the Treaties, here 
we have found the examples of the new proposal makers other than the 
Commission:  
A group of certain number of Member States 
Art 76 TFEU At least a quarter of the Member States may initiative the acts 
referred to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation.  
Art 48(2) TEU The Government of any Member State may submit the proposals 
for the amendment of the Treaties.  
European Parliament 
Art 48(2) TEU The European Parliament may submit the proposals for the 
amendment of the Treaties. 
Article 225 TFEU The European Parliament may request the Commission to 
submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Union 
act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. If the Commission 
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does not submit a proposal, it shall inform the European Parliament of the 
reasons. 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  
Art18, 28, 30, 41, 42(4) TEU, Art. 218, 331, 354 TFEU Proposals on CFSP  
HR, jointly with the Commission, submits joint proposal  
22 TEU, 215,222 TFEU Proposals on the strategic interest and objects of the 
Union relating to CFSP and other aspects of external action, or on the economic 
and financial relations with third countries, or on the reaction to terrorist attacks 
or natural or man-made disaster in a spirit of solidarity. 
Other than the above mentioned new comer in the field of proposal making, 
Art 11(4) TEU confirms a Citizen initiative right that not less than one million 
citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take 
the initiative of inviting the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal for 
the purpose of implementing the Treaties. Even though the Commission, 
however, is not obliged to do so and the citizens shall not be considered as 
proposal maker, it is a noteworthy democratic mark to EU law-making that the 
EU citizens may have the opportunity to request new legislation. 
Although President Barroso ever indicated in 2009 that the position and the 
importance of the Commission are beyond doubt56, changes in the legislative 
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proceeding brought by the Treaty of Lisbon have indeed made the make the 
Commission weaker than before. 
Firstly, proposals on CFSP are now be made mainly by the High 
Representative. The Treaties draw a quite clear line to distribute proposing 
powers to the certain body according to the specified duty of him/her.  
Secondly, the Commission shares with the Member States the priority on 
making proposal in the field of AFSJ. AFSJ once belonged to the third pillar and 
now is within the community method aspect. Confirming the proposing power 
on the Member States is respecting them in the traditional sovereignty-linked 
policy field. 
Moreover, the initiative powers by the citizens and European Parliament add 
democracy tune to Union’s legislative proceeding, by which the author of the 
Treaties intends to get the EU more legitimacy and support from its citizens. 
Besides, due to Art 208 TEC, the Council may request the Commission to 
undertake any studies… and to submit to it any appropriate proposals. Now, in 
addition, by Art 241 TFEU, if the Commission does not submit a proposal, it 
shall inform the Council of the reasons. To some extent, the Treaties give the 
Council an indirect power of making proposal.  
At the same time, the European Parliament now has the exactly same arm (Art. 
225 TFEU). On one hand, the impacts on the Commission by the two 
legislatures have been balanced; on the other hand, the control over the 
Commission is stricter, which even more pushes the Commission to focus on 
technical role rather than political player.  
Even though the Commission is not obliged to propose under request of the 
co-legislatures as the provisions cited above, it is for the Commission to ponder 
when it’s under certain political pressure. 
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In the field concerning the international agreements, the negotiators on the 
Union’s behalf are the ones actually propose the legislative acts signing and 
concluding the agreements. Besides the analysis in Chapter 1 Section 2 of this 
paper, which contains that the Commission is almost the main negotiator other 
than the sphere of CFSP, the Commission is not the only negotiation player of 
course with the international agreements concerning monetary or foreign 
exchange regime matters. The European Central Bank must be the competent 
one to fully associate and to be consulted as necessity. (Article 219(3) TFEU) 
Although the unique negotiator role of the Commission has been reduced after 
Lisbon Treaty, it benefits in exerting the specialized functions of all the 
institutions or actors involved. The Union would operate in a better way if the 
powers are distributed to more actors in a rational way. 
 
SECTION 2. “COMITOLOTY” (QUASI-LEGISLATION ) 
1. General introduction of “Comitology” 
Comitology started to emerge in the 1960s in the field of Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP), “when the Council realized that it lacked the 
resources to make all necessary implementation rules and decided to delegate 
implementing powers to the Commission.” 57  Since the implementing of 
legislation is totally different with the legislating itself, in order to facilitate the 
procedures of uniformity of the implement, “to keep speedy pace with the ever 
changing events, science or markets”58, to make full use of the professional and 
technical talent human resources in the Commission and even to evade the 
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sensitive issue during the legislative procedure59, the legislators have to entrust 
an agent, the Commission, to push European law into realization. From the very 
start point, “Comitology” has become a widely used procedure in the EU 
decision-making system. 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, Art 202 TEC provided that “the Council may 
confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down”. That is to be 
explained that the Council, then as the EU legislator “may find it necessary to 
entrust the Commission with the adoption of certain implementing rules in 
respect of EU legislative act to insure that it is applied in a uniform and 
consistent manner. And when entrusting the Commission, the EU legislator will 
provide for a system of control over the exercise of such implementing powers 
by the Commission.”60 The system of entrusting and control the execution over 
the Commission is “Comitology”.  
After the Treaty of Lisbon, “Comitology” system has been codified in art 290 
and 291 of TFEU, which provide the control of Commission’s “delegated 
powers” and “implementing powers”.  
The former one provides that a legislative act (adopted by the European 
Parliament and Council through co-decision procedure) may delegate to the 
Commission the power to adopt “delegated act” that will supplement or amend 
certain non-essential elements of the basic act, which is confirmed as a Treaty 
provision for the first time where it has been exiting in practice before Lisbon 
Treaty.  
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According to the latter one “where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on 
the Commission (or on the Council in certain cases)”61 though the Treaties 
respect the principle that the power of implementing the EU law basically 
belongs to the Member States, which “will continue to be subject to the same 
Comitology regime” 62.  
In theory, according to Art. 290 and Art. 291 of TFEU, the distinction between 
the two acts mentioned above lays in that: “delegated acts” do not need a 
separated legislative act to delegate power; while, the “implementing acts” needs 
an extra regulation 63in advance through the co-decision procedure by the 
Council and European Parliament (more specifically, the ordinary legislative 
procedure) to lay down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms 
for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers64.  
However, in practice, the difference is not easy to define.  
In general, according to Mr. Anders Neergaard of the European Parliament’s 
legal service, “Policy orientations should be delegated acts and technical 
applications of rules should be implementing acts”. 65 Or Professor Thomas 
Christiansen and Dr. Mathias Dobbels introduce in their article that “what 
Member States should do, which constitutes a delegated act, as opposed to ‘how’ 
Member States are to act to carry out the obligations set by a legislative act, 
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which would constitute an implementing act.” 66  Commission experts Mr. 
Mario-Paulo Tenreiro agreed: "The key issue is going to be how to distinguish 
between an implementing and a delegated act. This is a legal question, not a 
political one. If we get it wrong it will have to be settled in court".67 
In implementation, the distinction lies in aspects as following: 
Firstly, the degree of formalization of the legal basis differs.  
Implementing act, according to the treaty norms, is based on a legislative act 
as the common rule of procedure which is “Regulation No 182/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers”. This regulation 
codifies detailed procedures about the entire accomplished system of 
implementation of implementing act: the aim, the subject matter, selection of 
procedures, rules of Advisory procedure and examination procedure, voting rules 
in committees, appeal procedure in the appeal committee and also the right of 
scrutiny by the Council and the European Parliament and so on. The high degree 
formalization method leaves the Commission less leeway to execute 
autonomously, which on the other hand prevents the institutional grey zone in 
horizontal relationship. 
Delegated act is built on each legislative act’s special indication where in 
itself may define the objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of 
power.  This case by case mode imposes “delegated act” certain uncertainty in 
practice. There is no legal rule of procedure coordinating horizontal 
inter-institutional competence. There is no working pattern for the internal 
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operation in the Commission. As well, there is no standard for the executing the 
right of revoking delegation or veto power by the Council or the European 
Parliament. Without a doubt, the primary law confers on the co-legislatures the 
veto power and the revocation right under no condition, which can be considered 
as the strong control of legitimacy over the delegation. However, it can also be 
treated from the other side of this coin, if in practice these two hanging stones 
are to be abused as tools of soft power of amendment the draft delegated acts. 
The only existing inter-institutional text, endorsed by the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament, is the “Common Understanding of 
European Parliament, Council and Commission on delegated acts on 4 April 
2011”, which hasn’t a legally binding nature and is broadly recognized as a 
“gentleman’s agreement” and solely guaranteed by the principle of loyal 
cooperation. Besides this text, the practice of the co-legislature since 2006 
Comitology reform is also the soft-law. In 2006 Comitology reform, “regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny” was introduced into the scheme of implementing 
delegated power upon the Commission. Comparing with the Lisbon Treaty 
provision of article 290, regulatory procedure with scrutiny is the most likely 
working method may be followed in delegated act’s practice, since that 
procedure highlights the right of scrutiny by the Council and the European 
Parliament than any other Comitology procedures which do not involve both of 
the co-legislatures on equal footing. In fact, both the Council and the European 
Parliament have already followed that procedure for three years before Lisbon 
Treaty and they are quite experienced. Consequently, the implementation of 
delegated act has followed the three-year practice, a gentleman’s agreement and 
the principle of loyal cooperation since Lisbon Treaty came into force. 
Second, the concrete working methods are of difference. 
Implementing act inherits the traditional Comitology’s scheme where there 
stands the committee for consultation and voting at all procedures. Furthermore, 
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Regulation 182/2011 has introduced the appeal committee as the last resort 
dealing the draft implementing acts. Due to this committee model, the 
Commission cannot depart away very much from the intention of legislatures. 
Delegated act does not involve any committee. It is of large possibility to 
consult the experts from national level or from the European Parliament, while it 
is not the obligation of the Commission to take account of the experts’ opinion. 
Since there is no formal rule of procedure, the Council and the European 
Parliament haven’t found a legal path to intervene the undergoing drafting 
process. The Commission is always declining to reject the input before it 
accomplishes the draft delegated acts. After finishing the drafts, the Commission 
would hand them over to both of the legislatures. If there is no objection or no 
opinion within three months, the delegated acts adopt. Comparing with 
implementing act, delegated act provides the Commission much leeway and 
relevant larger scope of discretion. 
Last but not the least, the role and the competence of the Council and the 
European Parliament are not alike. 
Implementing act relies in large scale on the committee. The committee, also 
the appeal committee, is composed of national representatives who are 
safeguarding the national interest as their counterparts do in the Council. In 
practice, before Lisbon Treaty, the Comitology procedure involves the Council 
as the supervisor and last resort. Although after Lisbon Treaty the appeal 
committee takes the place of the Council, the membership of appeal committee 
always shares the same group of representatives in COREPERⅠin the Council. 
Whereas, the European Parliament does not have substantial role in practice, 
although the right of scrutiny confers the power upon it.  
Delegated act makes the European Parliament manage to function on equal 
footing with the Council. It was the European Parliament striving for the 
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scrutiny power in 2006 Comitology reform. And MEPs have operated the 
“regulatory procedure with scrutiny” in a quite experienced way since then. 
Furthermore, since there is not any committee role in delegated act, the 
European Parliament has the competence as it shares in co-legislation procedure 
with the Council equally through the whole process.  
Most remarkably, the Treaties do not confer the legislatures the right of 
amendment, however, either of the Council or the European Parliament has a 
veto power and the right to revocation under no condition. While in the 
“regulatory procedure with scrutiny”, there are three legal criteria that can 
invoke the veto power by the legislatures: the draft measures proposed by the 
Commission exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic 
instrument or that the draft is not compatible with the aim or the content of the 
basic instrument or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or 
proportionality68. As a result, the present “primary law based” decisive power 
simplifies the institutional interaction as a “take it or leave it” model.  
It is less confused after the analysis of the distinction between the two 
instruments of non-legislative acts. Whereas, in practice, the institutions are not 
willing to wipe out the grey zone in selection either of them. Each of them has a 
preference. 
The Council is committed to the implementing act. As described above, the 
implementing act maintains the committee as the traditional Comitology scheme. 
The practice does not change much comparing with pre-Lisbon era. The Council 
controls the envisaged implementing acts directly or indirectly by the national 
representatives in the committee and appeal committee. 
The Commission is in favor of delegated act. Implementing act is highly 
formalization and supervised under the committees. The Commission cannot 
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produce any creative or autonomous work within implementing act system. On 
the contrary, the delegated act is still lack of legal binding basis as general 
framework to procuduralize the horizontal relationship among EU institutions. 
The Commission could insist on the ex post deliberation by the Council and the 
European Parliament in order to preclude the institutional intervention in half 
way of drafting.  
The European Parliament prefers the delegated act as well, although the 
reason is not coincident with the Commission. Lisbon Treaty leads the European 
Parliament to a way of revolution in its power, both in legislative procedure and 
in non-legislative arena. The above discussed unconditional veto power and 
revoking power on draft delegated acts spurs the MEPs to deliberate the drafts 
much actively than ever. This is because that the competence and the substantial 
impact of the European Parliament in delegated act are in larger scope and with 
less restraint. It is to be easier for the MEPs and the key actors in the European 
Parliament to input their positions if they incline to dissent the draft as a whole 
solely due to one or two articles. 
As a consequence, since there are no precise criteria to define the margin 
between the implementing act and delegated act, the institutional conflict would 
be triggered at any occasion. The remedy shall be the referral to European Court 
of Justice. However, until there is a hard-law legal basis, the vagueness and the 
grey zone still exist 
2. The logic of “Comitology” and its development 
The Commission is well-known as the watch-dog of the interests of the Union. 
Although the first to implement are the Member States, the interest of good 
implementation of the EU law is right laid down in the scope of the 
Commission’s task. 
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2.1  Before the Treaty of Lisbon 
Council Decision 1999/468/ of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for 
the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (amended by 
Decision 2006/512/EC) ruled the Comitology in a detailed way.  
By this Decision, firstly, in all the procedures therein, the Commission shall 
be assisted by committees composed of the representatives of the Member 
States.  
Secondly, the Advisory procedure gave the Commission more flexibility on 
adoption of implementing acts, with the Commission taking the utmost account 
of the opinion delivered by the committee (Art 3 of Decision 1999/468).  
Thirdly, in the Management procedure and Regulatory procedure, which were 
the most used operations in practice, closely involved the voting of the 
committees. If the committees were happy with the draft measures, the measures 
would be adopted. When the draft measures are not in accordance with the 
opinion of the committees, by QMV in favor of referral (Art 4 of Decision 
1999/468) or failed to adopt the draft by QMV (Art 5 of Decision 1999/468), the 
draft measures would be submitted to the Council for deciding. The Council then 
had the power to control over the drafts of the Commission whether to 
re-examine, amend, adopt or non-adopt.  
The logic was: the actors of implementing the EU law are the Member States 
at the basic level, which is the principle that the Union leaves the freedom and 
rights to the Member States. So even if the implementation is basically the 
business of the Member States, then, when the Commission is entrusted, the 
committees should be made up of the representatives of the Member States as 
the consequence, seeking to control over the procedures undergoing within the 
Commission. 
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However, the mechanism led to a legal and logical error. The measures taken 
by the committees should not be called “legislative act” since the committee 
were not a legislative authority and played only as a consultative role. But the 
measures adopted were the ones implementing the legislative acts, which 
“actually modified the basic legislative act itself”69. “This did not hold for 
scrutiny of cases where the legislature authorized the Commission to amend a 
legislative act. The power to amend a legislative act lies with the legislature 
itself, not with the Member States. Scrutiny of this delegation of powers should 
therefore belong to the legislature, not to the Member States”. So mentioning the 
lack of scrutiny, Comitology was considered as lack of legitimacy.  
As well as in practice, the European Parliament had been struggling for more 
influence and involvement in the law-making proceedings. In the aspect of 
Comitology, “the Parliament had become increasingly uneasy during the 1990s 
about delegating powers to the Commission that it thought would be better 
exercised by the co-decision procedure. It was agreed that regulatory measures 
based on a parent instrument adopted under co-decision procedure would be 
notified to the Parliament and it could object through a Resolution if it 
considered they exceeded the implementing power granted by the parent 
instrument.” 70 Then the Art.8 of the Decision 1999/468 had demonstrated the 
involved controlling on the Commission’s draft measures by the Parliament.  
Furthermore, the European Parliament continued to claim its un-fully 
involvement in Comitology by indicated that the Commission “failed to respect 
Parliament’s rights under Comitology” 71 . As a result, Decision 2006/512 
amended the Decision 1999/468, introducing the Regulatory procedure with 
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scrutiny. Besides the ever existing voting by the committees, the Council and the 
European Parliament would additionally keep an eye on the Commission’s draft 
measures where either of the former can veto the draft on the ground that the 
draft measure exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the basic 
instrument, or the draft is not compatible with the aim or the content of the basic 
instrument, or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality72. 
2.2  After the Treaty of Lisbon 
In the Treaty of Lisbon, “delegated acts” and “implementing acts” shall be 
analyzed separately. What these two arms in common is that they both require to 
be called to start within co-decided legislative acts and be controlled over under 
scrutiny by the Council and the European Parliament on equal footing. 
In the situation of “delegated acts”, it is a new comer in the Treaties in 
provisional sense, but it has been operated quite a time before Lisbon Treaty 
with the “look appearance” as Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny due to 2006 
Comitology reform.  
There is no committees’ role in “delegated acts” procedure, just with the broad 
consulting by the Commission to some certain groups composed of experts from 
Member States “in order to ensure that the delegated acts will be properly 
applied later on by the Member States’ authorities.”73 The consultation is always 
a rather sensitive topic de facto. The Council is keen on arrange an experts team 
just as the committee in implementing act scheme. The European Parliament 
also emphasis on the necessity of consultation, but insists the involvement of 
experts assigned by itself as a must. Whereas, the Commission considers this 
sort of intention as the back door of intervening in its drafting autonomy. It also 
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indicates that it is not obligatory to follow the experts’ opinion and it is not 
necessary to consult them all the time.  
This ex ante defence, however, if over used, may probable lead to the 
reluctant non-objection in the legislatures. The co-legislatures could definitely 
let the three months’ period flow with no opinion, which may delay the adoption 
of the delegated act in a legal way. If the Commission could open to the two 
legislatures at a certain occasion during drafting process, it is of great chance 
that the former may get “early non-objection”74 as reward.  
Additionally, according to Art 290(2) TFEU, either the Council or European 
Parliament has the rights of objection and revocation on any ground. As a result, 
first of all, it is conclusive that where there is more power of delegation and 
flexibility, there is more power of scrutiny. In this case, the essential elements of 
an area shall be reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the 
subject of a delegation of power, which restates that the Commission has no 
power to legislate. And consequently the original intention of the legislature 
cannot be distorted.  
Secondly, the new norms clarify the principle of “indirect administration”75 
and exception of this fundamental principle by stating that Member States will 
enjoy the main powers of implementing with the association of the Commission 
by “implementing powers” under rules made through the ordinary legislative 
procedure by the European Parliament and the Council. To this extent, it 
convinces the citizens that the Commission is supervised by two genuine 
legislatures with increased power. On the other hand, the veto power or the 
revocation power could also be transferred as amendment power in a soft form, 
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which squeezes the leeway of the Commission.   
While in the “implementing acts”, the former Comitology regime applies, 
with the adoption of Regulation 2011/182 on behalf of Art 291(3) TFEU under 
the ordinary legislative procedure by the European Parliament and the Council 
as the updated secondary legal resource’s support.  
Within the new Comitology, above all, the “committees” still exist and 
moreover the “appeal committee” has been introduced with which the draft 
implementing acts will be decided after the committee holds negative opinion 
towards it when the Commission is willing to adopt the original draft rather than 
submit an amended version.76  
To be followed with, Advisory procedure has been codified as “general rule”77, 
which leaves more autonomous space for the Commission. The Commission is 
not strictly obliged to follow the opinion of the committees, only taking utmost 
account of it78.  
Thirdly, the former Management procedure and Regulatory procedure are 
replaced by a single procedure named “Examination procedure”. The 
replacement simplifies the classifying the drafts to certain policy fields. 
Moreover it speeds up the procedure of voting on the adoption of the draft 
implementing acts. According to previous Regulatory procedure, the envisaged 
acts may be adopted after obtaining qualified majority votes in favor in the 
committee79. In present Examination procedure, the requirement varies to be that 
the draft shall not be adopted if the committee delivers negative opinion by 
qualified majority voting, where the draft may adopt when even if there is no 
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opinion80. The threshold for approving is decreased indeed.  
Furthermore, when Examination procedure applies, there disappears the 
control by the Council who was involved and was supervising in former 
Management procedure and Regulatory procedure. Instead, the Commission 
may submit an amended version of draft implementing act to the same 
committee or deliver the draft to the appeal committee. Only where a basic act is 
adopted under ordinary legislative procedure and either the European Parliament 
or the Council indicates to the Commission that, in its view, a draft 
implementing act exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the basic act, 
the Commission will be under the pressure by those two institutions to review 
the draft, taking account of the position expressed, informing the European 
Parliament and the Council whether it intends to maintain, amend or withdraw 
the draft implementing act81, which is called the Right of Scrutiny. While in 
practice the right of scrutiny has been used in a very small proportion of 
operations. 
3. Institutional triangle relations by “Comitology” 
In the system of “Comitology”, in the earlier days, the Council (solely) 
conferred the delegate powers to the Commission to help implement the EU law 
with one of the motivations of protect the interests of the Member States. Since 
if build a set of institutions especially focusing on the implementation of the EU 
law, there would be truly huge administrative sessions, which could be 
controversy to the will of the Member States who always hope that the central 
administrative body maintains as smaller as possible.  
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Presently, the European Parliament, which stands for the interests of the 
citizens and also participates in the decision making on the “Comitology”, 
doesn’t will to see a too large and too powerful central body in the EU either.  
Furthermore, the Council loses its previous exclusive control over the 
Commission. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, in most cases, it was the Council who 
decided by itself to start the delegate procedure and it was also the Council to 
define the details of the delegate powers. Moreover, before 2006 “Comitology” 
reform, the Council had been having the power to accept or send back the draft 
of Commission by QMV, while the European Parliament only had a right of 
passing a non-binding resolution on its non-satisfactory of the Commission’s 
delegation power82. In 2006, the European Parliament started to seek for equal 
footing with the Council. In the Regulatory procedure with scrutiny, the 
European Parliament shares the same veto power with the Council within the 
“Comitology” system. By now, as a result of Lisbon Treaty, the co-decision 
procedure covers the relative “Comitology” and the Council is no more the sole 
start engine and monitor of the Commission’s delegate powers. In addition, the 
policy fields using “Comitology” has been broaden due to co-decision spreads 
into 45 more new policies. The parliamentary control power seems to bloom.  
At the same time, as mentioned above, the Council has been only left the right 
of scrutiny which is the same power as the European Parliament has, but loses 
the former power of examination on the Commission’s draft measures most 
probably once the committees were unhappy with the draft83. In this sense, the 
Council is largely weaker than before and its influence among the Commission 
has been cut to half. 
Why can the European Parliament break the single link between the Council 
and the Commission in “Comitology”?  
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Firstly, the ordinary legislative procedure impacts on “Comitology”. After 
Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament frequently puts pressure on both the 
Commission and the Council, threatening to withhold its support for a 
substantive legislative matter in the co-decision and/or budgetary and thereby 
indirectly influenced the shaping of “Comitology” rules. This has been the main 
driver of change in the shaping of “Comitology” rules as regards the role of the 
Parliament. It led to a co-equal position of the European Parliament with the 
Council under delegated acts. In “Comitology”, a clear pattern emerges: once the 
Parliament had obtained a veto power under co-decision, it successfully used the 
latter to obtain substantive policies in return for more institutional power under 
“Comitology”.84 
Moreover, the Commission is willing to tolerate more control from the 
European Parliament because firstly the Commission prefer to escape from the 
controversy of being lack of legitimacy and democracy by getting itself closer to 
another Community measure entity and declaring to dedicate itself to the right 
and benefit of the EU citizens, which is the view the European Parliament holds 
from the very beginning. Commission begins to pay more attention to satisfy the 
European Parliament instead of its previous “boss”, the Council.  
But what is the most important, in light of Art 17(7), (8)TEU, the Commission 
is voted by the European Parliament at the beginning of the 5-year term; the 
Commission is also overshadowed by the European Parliament with the motion 
of censure with which the latter may “fire” the Commission as a whole. This 
political control draws the Commission closer to the European Parliament and 
the parliamentary input thereof, rather than to the Council. 
In short, inevitably the relationship between the Council and the Commission 
can be strongly influenced by the European Parliament. At least, though together 
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with the European Parliament, the power of the controlling on the Commission 
by the Council as legislature has been improved. The delegation has been better 
over sighted so that the European Union legislative acts will be supplemented, 
amended and implemented in a way of European level, with least influence from 
national level. In a long term, the reform and power transaction are of great 
importance for the division of work among the institutions and furthermore for 
the political integration of the European Union. 
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CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 2 
Since Lisbon Treaty has brought several new ideas about the initiative entities, 
the Commission seems to be not lonely. However, it is rather the increase in the 
democratic concern than the actual facts have been happening. The Commission 
is still the principal proposal maker in EU from internal policies to international 
agreements.  
As far as the political agenda setting competence has been transferred to the 
European Council, the Council of ministers has to wait until the general mandate 
from the former. Usually, when the European Council adopts certain mandate or 
agreement among its members, it is the Commission to press the start engine for 
the actual legislative activity by proposing draft acts. Therefore, the legislative 
agenda in the Council lays largely on the agenda of the Commission. Before 
Lisbon Treaty era, the situation was reverse, since the Council chaired the 
European Council as well.  
Besides that changing character mentioned in above paragraph, the 
inter-institutional relationship on proposal making between the Council and the 
Commission does not transform in any factual way after Lisbon Treaty. 
In the phase after proposal making but before the first reading, the increasing 
influence from the European Parliament as co-legislature drives the Commission 
to stress on the opinion of the former more than ever before. Within ordinary 
legislative procedure, the Commission passed the draft acts onto both the 
European Parliament and the Council. It is the European Parliament has the right 
to firstly express its own opinion or amendment on the draft. And then the 
legislative working procedure in the Council, in the sense of the Treaty norms, 
begins on the basis of Parliamentary opinion.  
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Due to the European Parliament Rules of Procedure 85 , the European 
Parliament is able to “detect substantial amendments mad by the Council, early 
on in the process”86. At the same time, the Commission has always been invited 
to the meetings of the Council. From both the Council itself and the Commission, 
the European Parliament could anticipate rather accurate the intention of the 
Council before its own opinion or amendment to the draft acts early before 
Plenary procedure, which “to some degree limits opportunities for strategic 
behavior of the Council presidency towards the European Parliament”87. In 
between the co-legislatures, the Commission plays the role as a “one-way” 
informing tube directing to the European Parliament. To this sense, the Council 
is losing driving power in the relationship with the proposal maker due to the 
shifting favor of the latter to the European Parliament. 
Other than the institutional re-balancing in legislative procedure mentioned 
above, the Council reencounters a passive situation in Comitology under the 
Parliamentary shadow in comparison with the story before Lisbon Treaty. The 
preference in common by the Commission and the European Parliament has set 
the Council a bit aside when the former two entities insist on the choice of 
“delegate acts”. Before Lisbon Treaty, the Comitology was in the sole pocket of 
the Council, and the European Parliament could not imagine any genuine 
decisive power in this area. Lisbon Treaty raises the Parliamentary scrutiny 
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power in Comitology system and re-balances the institutional relationship as the 
one of more legitimacy. 
Last but not the least, in parallel with Comitology system, recently the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law has confirmed the delegation to EU 
agencies, bodies or offices by the co-legislatures. In case C-270/12, the Council 
and the European Parliament delegated a sort of executive power to an EU 
agency called “European Securities and Markets Authority”(ESMA) on 
regulating short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps which is of 
concern on the financial market in EU. The United Kingdom argued the lack of 
legitimacy of such delegation in four grounds, among which it was challenging 
the compatibility with the article 290 and article 291 of TFEU (Comitology 
system). ECJ distinguishes the delegation to ESMA from the one to the 
Commission, implying that the delegation to EU agencies could run parallel with 
Comitology system. ECJ stresses on what have not been written by Treaty norms 
and delivered that the Treaties have already presuppose the possibility of 
delegation to EU agencies88. In addition, ECJ illustrates the existence of several 
legal procedures, such as annulment procedure, failure of act and preliminary 
procedure, in which the subject matter includes the EU bodies or agencies and 
also theirs adopting acts89. In light of the possibility to be pursuing to judicial 
review, ECJ confirms vesting EU agencies or bodies with certain 
decision-making powers in an area which requires the deployment of specific 
technical and professional expertise.90From this case-law, the Council (and also 
the European Parliament) could have an additional choice where requires 
delegation on technical concern. And it is of necessity because the Commission 
itself is not able to undertake a huge number of technical tasks in EU. From ever 
existing practice, the EU agencies, bodies or offices are of swifter response than 
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the Commission. The Comitology should apply to certain rule of procedure, 
whereas delegating to EU agencies, bodies or offices has not any procedural 
constraint yet. As a result, this case-law has already granted the existence of such 
an agency-delegation in parallel with Comitology. From now on, the 
co-legislatures have to consider about the establishment of a complete system of 
delegation to EU agencies, bodies or offices, in so far as that would be another 
quasi-legislative power like Comitology which should run in a legal way. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RELATION OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
SECTION 1. CO-LEGISLATURES  
When the European Economic Community was found in 1957, the legislator 
was solely the Council. The Assembly (European Parliament’s predecessor) was 
weak and of little actual function.  
The Single European Act had introduced the so called “co-operation 
procedure”. The European Parliament started its first step to have powers in 
legislative activities, although the “co-operation” procedure only applied to 
limited aspects of policy making91, for instance: anti- discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, free movement of workers, freedom of establishment, 
mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other qualifications, and the 
approximation of Laws, etc. The procedure composed of two readings in which 
the Council dominated. The European Parliament’s Opinion could only possibly 
increase the difficulty of voting in the Council from Qualified Majority to 
Unanimity, but impossible to block the adoption of acts.92  
The Maastricht Treaty widened the application of the co-operation procedure 
which shall apply to where reference is made in the Treaty to this procedure. The 
European Parliament then shall act jointly with the Council in legislative acts 
making93, not only increasing the voting difficulty of the Council, but also acting 
as a block power on the draft acts. The procedure had also been accomplished 
further into three readings scheme with Conciliation Committee procedure94, 
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which was rather similar with the presently used co-legislative procedure. 
However, in this procedure, the first reading did start from the Council’s part, 
and if the European Parliament agreed with the Council’s common position, the 
act was adopted, which was the reverse situation with present co-legislative 
procedure. The second reading was more or less the same with procedure 
nowadays except for a possible direct delivery to the Conciliation Committee at 
this phase. After the third reading, the so called Conciliation Committee 
procedure, if there was no joint text, the Council still might have one chance to 
adopt the act on the wording of its common position before the Conciliation 
Committee procedure by qualified majority voting. Therefore, the domain role 
still inclined to the Council.  
Though the Nice Treaty eliminated the possibility for the Council to adopt the 
act after the Conciliation Committee ending with no joint text95, the European 
Parliament had not become to equal footing with the Council in legislation. 
Codified by the Treaty of Lisbon, “ordinary legislative procedure” 
(co-decision) procedure has become the main legislative procedure in EU, by Art 
16 TEU, Art 289 and 294 TFEU. The European Parliament joint with the 
Council acts the roles of legislature and adopt most of the legislative acts all 
together. In this case, the relations between these two actors lay in two different 
legislative procedures as follows. 
1. Ordinary legislative procedure 
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, this kind of procedure dominates the field 
of the legislation, which combines the two legislative institutions to work on 
equal foot on the proposals submitted by the Commission. With the amendment 
made by the Lisbon Treaty, the Council has to learn to share much more powers 
with the European Parliament in almost thirty more cases of variable importance 
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and provided for in fourteen new legal bases.96 
  When examining the provisions on ordinary legislative procedure, we could 
draw two main features on the balance between the co-legislatures. 
Firstly, the European Parliament has the veto power twice. One may happen in 
the second reading on the draft with the amendment of the Council. The other 
lays in the approval on the joint text by the conciliation committee. Although the 
European Parliament rarely uses the veto power in legislative practice97, the veto 
power is as a hanging stone to safeguard the parliamentary input. 
Second, the Council is required the “unanimity” when itself is willing to 
amend the draft. This point is not firstly come out by the Treaty of Lisbon. From 
Rome Treaty, the “unanimity” has been the necessity if the Council tends to 
amend the draft act. Yet, with the wide spread of the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the balance between the two legislatures has been leaning to the 
European Parliament. Because it is the European Parliament who may actually 
improve the draft on its position and “if the Commission agrees with the 
Parliament, it is easier for the Council to accept parliamentary amendments than 
to produce its own”98. 
Though the provisions seem to be rather complicated, in practice, most acts 
are adopted in the first reading. Although the drafts have to undergo the 
continuing second reading, the debates are very focus on the amendments or 
position of the Council where no new questions are posed, which increases the 
speed of legislation. The European Parliament has been very cooperative with 
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the Council in fact, rarely blocks drafts by its predicted powers. By now, only in 
two cases the European Parliament blocked the draft acts and let the 
Commission to submit new drafts: one was on the infrastructure in Arab, and the 
other was on the passengers’ personal data.  
There are three compromises in the legislative practice: in the Council, in the 
European Parliament and a super compromise between the two. Technical 
questions in the draft acts have been transformed into political ones which are 
the real controversy points implied in the proposals. In the Council, discussion 
and negotiation between different positions occur at COREPER level 
coordinated by the Rotating Presidency. In the European Parliament, the real 
works to compromise among political groups are in the Committees rather than 
in the Plenary of European Parliament where is only a theater. The coordinator in 
the Committees is the chosen Rapporteur who is together with the president of 
COREPER promotes the super comprise between the co-legislatures. All those 
debate and compromise frequently are ahead of voting. Besides, informal 
Trilogues involving the Commission could be hold in the early phase of 
co-legislation to obtain a common sense among the three institutions. So far, the 
Trilogues and the political priorities of the Rapporteur and the Rotating 
Presidency could speed up the process on one hand, and invoke the criticism of 
democratic deficit on the other. For the daily life of EU, compromising process 
should attach importance to the minorities’ interest. While in the face of urgency, 
imperfect legislation is better than no legislation. The fast track solves the 
principal issues to serve the EU Law system avoiding non legitimacy of 
measures coping with the newly come situations. Nevertheless, the 
implementation of fast track in urgency should enact the conditions which set a 
limit of application period, group of people or certain crisis issues. Once the 
conditions are not fulfilled any more or the urgent situation is ending, the 
co-legislatures should re-exam the piece of act whether to amend or annul.  
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2. Special legislative procedure 
Special legislative procedure, also codified in art 289 TFEU, requires the 
adoption of legislative acts by the Council alone or with the European 
Parliament. Here we discuss about the “consent” procedure. Under “consent” 
procedure, on one hand, if the legislative acts are adopted by the Council with 
the consent of the European Parliament, then the latter holds a sort of “veto 
power”. As a traditional legislative institution, the Council held the legislative 
power from very early time and it has used to control the key process of 
law-making, while the European Parliament is a new comer, compared with the 
Council. Therefore the Council again loses its power and consequently the 
European Parliament step up further. This important change brought by the 
Treaty of Lisbon is purely an art of balance in itself, which is just subversion to 
the traditional legislative institution. 
 
SECTION 2. RAISING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMET’S STAGE  
1. Analysis through treaty norms 
As the quasi same situation above in the legislative procedure, the European 
Parliament has been witnessed from a consulting role to a consent role. 
Within the Treaty of Rome, international agreements shall be concluded by 
the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote and after consulting the 
Assembly99 .  
The Single European Act raised the power of the European Parliament one 
step forward that the association agreements should be concluded by the Council 
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after receiving the assent of European Parliament100.  
Maastricht Treaty broadened the scope of assent power’s application. Besides 
the association agreements, there were three more situations applying to 
Parliamentary assent: the agreements establishing a specific institutional 
framework by organizing co-operation procedures, the agreements having 
important budgetary implications for the Community and the agreements 
entailing amendment of an act adopted under the co-operation procedure101.  
Lisbon Treaty has conferred on the European Parliament the most spread 
power in concluding international agreements. Article 218(6) TFEU lists five 
categories of international agreements which call for the “consent” of European 
Parliament. These are not five single types of agreements, but almost all the 
international agreements the EU may conclude with the exception of agreements 
relate exclusively to the CFSP. Although the European Parliament cannot have a 
say on the CFSP relating agreements, it shall be immediately and fully informed 
at all stages of the procedure which means including the CFSP agreements’ 
proceeding.  
Furthermore, the European Parliament Committee on budgetary control is 
particularly concerned in verifying how the EU budget, specifically the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (Article 312 TFEU), is spent on external 
relations, in particular regarding CFSP102.  
On the background of significant changes after Lisbon Treaty, the Council and 
the Commission are under the pressure to conduct with much more 
considerations on the Parliamentary position.  
It is probably too much stressed about the newly born strong parliamentary 
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veto power, the Council quite hastily concluded the SWIFT Agreement with the 
US just several hours before the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
However, the European Parliament finally managed to reject that agreement by 
the reason of protection of fundamental rights specifically protection of personal 
data. International agreements’ negotiation have to be more transparency to the 
European Parliament and to the public, otherwise they may be probably rejected 
on the ground of the secrete negotiation behind a closed door.  
The ACTA failed mainly due to the severe lack of access to the information by 
the European Parliament. As well, most of EP Committees have never given 
consent to international agreements before Lisbon Treaty, so that they are 
attaching much importance to their role and responsibility to conduct the consent 
power. In practice, they are very cooperatively and actively. They may, however, 
veto the agreements envisaged for the reasons of protection human rights, of 
fundamental rights, of justice, of the Union’s consumers or farmers etc. As a 
result, this consent power also attracts more concerns from third countries on the 
positions or the conditions addressed by the European Parliament, which is “a 
sort of a second mandate for negotiations”103.  
The role of the Council here seems to be passive and defensive, and it seems 
to be combined with the Commission at the confrontation of the European 
Parliament. Once the negotiation is open, the Council’s position is more or less 
the Commission’s. Because of the precondition of opening a negotiation with 
third parties is the approval by the Council on the Recommendation from the 
Commission. As long as the negotiation is ending with a draft agreement, the 
Council and the Commission have to resort to the examination by the European 
Parliament. The Council also has to reply the oral and written questions from 
MEPs in order to step forward towards the final conclusion.  
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2. Case studies  
2.1 ACTA 
The case of ACTA agreement is typical for the parliamentary power after 
Lisbon Treaty.  
ACTA is the abbreviation of “Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between 
the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United 
States of America”. 
ACTA was firstly developed by Japan and the United States in 2006. EU 
joined the preliminary talks throughout 2006 and 2007. Official negotiations 
began in June 2008. From 2008 to 2010, the negotiation had lasted three years 
on the international framework for improving the enforcement of intellectual 
property right laws and creating improved international standards for action 
against large–scale infringements of intellectual property. On 16th of April 2010, 
the negotiating countries had reached unanimous agreement to make the 
consolidated text.  
Nevertheless, for three-year negotiation, the public, as well as the European 
Parliament, had not been informed for any words about ACTA or been provided 
any channel of accessing to the documents. Although on 10th of March 2010, the 
European Parliament adopted a resolution on the transparency and state of play 
of the ACTA negotiations, the ACTA was still behind that closed door. The final 
text was released on 15 November 2010.  
In the scope of European Union relevant legal procedure, on 24th of June 
2011, the Commission delivered its initial legislative proposal. On 23th of 
August 2011, the Council published the legislative proposal for the conclusion 
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on the ACTA agreement. Although the EU has signed the agreement on 26 
January 2012, the signature did not mean the entry into effect of the agreement 
upon EU. Later on, the debate in the European Parliament had launched a broad 
discussion around ACTA.  
Under this high pressure of protesting ACTA, on 22 February 2012, the 
Commission decided to refer ACTA to the European Court of Justice, according 
to Art. 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility of it with the Treaties, especially 
with the Chart of Fundamental Right.   
22 June 2012, EP addressed Recommendation indicating to decline to give its 
consent. In December of 2012, Commission withdrew its referral to the ECJ. 
On 4th of July 2012, the European Parliament voted on ACTA with 478 votes 
against, 39 for and 165 abstentions, rejecting the approval of this agreement. The 
failure in Parliamentary voting announced the death of ACTA in the EU.  
Before the very end of ACTA’s fate in EU, the key EU institutions held 
diverse positions of their own. 
The Commission in its initial legislative proposal maintained that “Although 
ACTA does not modify the EU acquis, because EU law is already considerably 
more advanced than the current international standards, it will introduce a new 
international standard, building upon the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS 
Agreement (adopted in 1994). Thus, it will provide benefits for EU exporting 
right holders operating in the global market who currently suffer systematic and 
widespread infringements of their copyrights, trademarks, patents, designs and 
geographical indications abroad. At the same time, ACTA is a balanced 
agreement, because it fully respects the rights of citizens and the concerns of 
important stakeholders such as consumers, internet providers and partners in 
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developing countries.”104  
The Council adopted a resolution in support of ACTA on 25 September 2008. 
After the explosion of mass protesting ACTA, the Council chose to take stock of 
the situation awaiting the judgment of ECJ, without any substantial debate at 
their meetings after the Commission’s referral. When replying the written 
questions by the MEPs, the Council referred the transparency to the conduction 
of the Commission during the negotiation and evaded the questions on Council’s 
position onto the discussion at COREPER level.105    
The key points on the European Parliament’s side were the concerns on the 
lack of transparency to the European Parliament and to the public, vagueness of 
the identifications and text of ACTA, also on the protection of free access to 
internet and protection of personal data etc.106. Concretely, the European 
Parliament indicated that:  
“International agreements dealing with any aspect of criminal sanctions, 
online activity or intellectual property must clearly define the scope of the 
agreement and the protection of individual liberties, in order to avoid 
unintended interpretations of the agreement.  
Unintended consequences of the ACTA text is a serious concern. On 
individual criminalization, the definition of “commercial-scale”, the role of 
internet service providers and the possible interruption of the transit of generic 
medicines, the rapporteur maintains doubts that the ACTA text is as precise as is 
necessary.  
The intended benefits of this international agreement are far outweighed by 
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the potential threats to civil liberties. Given the vagueness of certain aspects of 
the text and the uncertainty over its interpretation, the European Parliament 
cannot guarantee adequate protection for citizens' rights in the future under 
ACTA.”107  
Mainly due to the lack of information and participation of the European 
Parliament and the uncertainty of interpretation of the text, the atmosphere all 
over the Europe was to reject ACTA. This trend possibly lead to the 
Commission’s withdraw the referral to the ECJ, considering the final death of 
ACTA in European Parliament.   
Besides of the lack of transparency to the European Parliament and the public, 
what was actually wrong with ACTA?  
There are the examples showing two of the main deficiencies of ACTA from 
the legal point of view of the EU. I would like to cite the excellent analysis from 
European Data Protection Supervisor and EDRI as following108: 
1. ACTA ruled with an extremely low threshold for imposing criminal sanctions 
and unproportionality109.  
Art.23(1)110 set the model that a “willful offences” of trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy plus an undefined 
“commercial scale” shall definitely generate the criminal procedures or criminal 
penalties. Even worse, the “willful offences” includes those acts: direct 
commercial advantage and undefined “indirect economic advantage” or “aiding 
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and abetting” 111 
If this article may come into force, the practical implication would probably as 
following112:  
A unintentionally poses copyright–protected images on his 
non-commercial website, for example the “Facebook” or “twitter”. Due to the 
personal influence, for instance a politician or a pop star, a considerable number 
of persons visits his webpage. The “large numbers of visits” to this page leads to 
a “commercial scale” reproduction of the image.  
” by not paying for these 
images.  
 not 
taking action.  
 
To the legal aspect, the sample indicates this article is forming a contradiction 
with international law and with the existing position of the European Parliament.  
WTO rules define “commercial scale” in relation to the “typical or usual 
commercial activity with respect to a given product in a given market”. While, 
ACTA does not specify this definition to a precise threshold and a narrow sense, 
which leads to criminal procedure directly without resorting to the first remedy 
such as civil compensation or administrative procedure. It is concerning 
copyright offence almost equal to murder or robbery at this extremely low 
threshold into crime. 
In the European Parliament’s previous position on exciting EU secondary 
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law113:the definition of “act” excludes those “carried out by private users for 
personal and not-for-profit purposes” be excluded114; “fair use” of works for 
comment, criticism, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research also are  
exclusive in determination the constitution of a crime concerning intellectual 
property rights115.  
2. ACTA allows mass surveillance that was in violation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Right of the European Union116. 
Art.27 (4) 117  requires Internet intermediaries to disclose the personal 
information of alleged infringers to rights-holders along the lines of the current 
IPR Enforcement Directive, which is to identify the person behind the IP 
address.  
No one can imagine that all the personal operation online would be supervised, 
like browsing the webpages, chatting with friends, watching a movie, replying 
an e-mail and so on, which leaves no way for the privacy, personal expression 
freedom and security of person data.  
In Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union, article 7 is titled 
with respect for private and family life; article 8 is the primary legal basis of 
protection of personal data; and article 11 guarantees the freedom of expression 
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and information.  
Although this article is aiming to protect the interests of rights-holders, it is 
over the line too much further, placing an economic right ahead of fundamental 
rights. As the Charter is within the legal framework of the Treaties, any 
international law incompatible with treaty norms should not be concluded in EU 
unless the revision of the Treaties. 
Moreover, the object under the article is including the infringers and the 
“alleged infringers”. The latter has placed innocent users in a presumption of 
guilty and leads to unnoticed monitoring of mass of individuals and all users, 
irrespective of whether they are under suspicion. 
In the last phrase of this article, there is the remedy for the defendant with 
“fair process”. However, it is doubtable the effectiveness and the operability of it. 
The reference to “fair process” is vague, without demanding the mandatory 
process or ensuring concrete and effective remedies against such interferences 
with fundamental rights.  
From the case of ACTA, the domain condition on European Parliament’s part, 
first of all, is the democracy, or the true participation of it. Other reasons, like 
concern on protection of personal data, are side dishes. The Council and the 
Commission have really learnt a lesson. The parliamentary guarantee shall 
function in the responsible way so that the Union and its citizens would truly 
benefit. 
2.2 EU- Mauritius sea piracy agreement 
EU- Mauritius sea piracy agreement is the “Agreement between the European 
Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected 
pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force 
to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after 
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transfer ”.  
In December 2008, the EU launched the “European Union Naval Force (EU 
NAVFOR) Somalia”,  within the framework of the European Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law in response to the rising 
levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Western 
Indian Ocean.118 
The mandate it to protect vessels of the World Food Program ( WFP)carrying 
humanitarian aid to displaced persons in Somalia, as well as "the vulnerable 
vessels cruising off the Somali coast, " up to the Indian shore.119  
Where and for the activities of the Union naval force to succeed in the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery, the 
question arises as the identification of states willing to activate the criminal 
proceedings and the definition of the relevant discipline for the treatment to be 
accorded: a)persons suspected of wanting to perform such acts or thefts, 
committing or having them committed , which have been stopped by the vessels 
belonging to the EU mission; b)the goods seized by the units of the EU military 
operation which are used to carry out acts thwarted , or that which constitutes the 
proceeds.  
The European Union agreed with the Republic of Mauritius the very 
conditions for the transfer and the treatment of suspects and assets affected by 
the enforcement actions piracy.  
For the agreement was based on Council Joint Action no. 2008/851/CFSP, it 
is within the field of CFSP that the Council is alone to decide to conclude a 
CFSP agreement. 
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However, the European Parliament considered the agreement as mixed nature. 
In article 7, for an example, the contents expand to the financial assistance, 
technical and logistical assistance to Mauritius to allow it to set up the structures, 
legislation, training of investors and prosecutors120. The European Parliament 
contends these as the external dimension of AFSJ, where the cooperation in 
criminal matters, police cooperation and development cooperation belong to the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Thus the European Parliament should have a 
consent power on this agreement. 
The Council insists on the nature of CFSP of the agreement. Without any 
effective political resolution, the European Parliament referred to the European 
Court of Justice to rule out (C-658/11). For the time being, there has not come 
out the judgment. 
If the ECJ rules the agreement as a mixed nature one, the European 
Parliament would take advantage of this case-law to have more broadened scope 
of consent power over international agreements. The only reserved zone of 
CFSP solely to the Council would shrink accordingly. 
2.3 Suspension the SWIFT 
SWIFT is the abbreviation of “Agreement between the EU and the USA on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the EU to US for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program” concluded by EU on 
13 July 2010.  
SWIFT was applying to EU finely when US National Security Agency 
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surveillance scandal explored in the summer of 2013. The press released the 
surveillance program also included spying EU, also on SWIFT.  
Almost one week later, the European Parliament adopted a resolution of 4 
July 2013 on the US National Security Agency surveillance program, 
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens' 
privacy (2013/2682(RSP)), with which it Instructs the Commission gathering all 
relevant information and evidence from both US and EU sources (fact-finding); 
investigating the alleged surveillance activities of US authorities as well as any 
carried out by certain Member States (mapping of responsibilities); assessing the 
impact of surveillance programs as regards: the fundamental rights of EU 
citizens; actual data protection both within the EU and for EU citizens outside 
the EU121 and so on. 
Afterwards, due to its serious “concern about recently revealed documents on 
the NSA’s activities as regards direct access to financial payment messages and 
related data, which would constitute a clear breach of the Agreement”122, and 
due to the fact that “no Member State has launched, or asked for, an 
investigation, in the absence of which the facts cannot be verified” after the 
European Parliament previously called for a full on-site technical investigation 
into allegations that the US authorities have had unauthorized access or created 
possible back doors in the SWIFT servers, the European Parliament adopted 
resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP (SWIFT) 
agreement as a result of US National Security Agency surveillance 
(2013/2831(RSP)) 
The MEPs treated NSA interception of SWIFT data as a mockery of the EU’s 
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agreement with the US. So that EU cannot continue to remain silent in the face 
of ongoing revelations  
218 (9)) to initiate the suspension or termination of an international agreement, 
Members considered that “the Commission would have to act if Parliament 
withdrew its support for a particular agreement”123. They pointed out that, 
“when considering whether or not to give its consent to future international 
agreements, Parliament would take account of the responses of the Commission 
and the Council in relation to this Agreement”124. 
As the response, the Commission refused the Parliamentary calls for 
suspending the SWIFT on 27 November 2013. The Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmstrom, for home affairs, said she had found no proof of U.S. wrongdoing, 
either in the sharing of flight passenger records or in the tracking of international 
payments; and she had received written assurances from the U.S. authorities125. 
News releases the criticism on Commission's move from MEP that "they are 
putting diplomatic relations ahead of citizens’ rights. The Commission is being 
extremely timid to the Americans; they have done an investigation and 
concluded that everything is hunky dory. This is not serious. Taking the United 
States at its word was naive.”126 
The European Parliament implements its power diligently, both legal and 
political, into almost all aspects of EU external relations. The Council was quite 
silent on the SWIFT issue, awaiting the outcome of confrontation between the 
Commission and the European Parliament. It is not legally blamed, since the 
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Council may suspend an agreement only after receiving the proposal from the 
Commission according Art.218 (9) TFEU. However, the Council should or may 
indicate a mandate to the Commission at appropriate time as the same as when 
launching an international negotiation.  
From the view of institutional position, the Council had been willing to adopt 
the SWIFT since the Eve before the day Lisbon Treaty came into force until it 
promoted the SWIFTⅡ (present TFTP) finally adopted. The suspension of 
SWIFT would have negative impact to its political reputation and legislation 
function. So that the Council didn’t step forward as the European Parliament 
behaved.  
As the check and balance to the relatively supranational institution, he 
European Parliament fulfilled its competence of protecting the interests of the 
citizens. The Parliamentary pressure imposed on the Commission was actually 
contesting the mass surveillance conduct of the US. It is probably one of the 
dominant reasons for that President Barak Obama announced significant changes 
on 17 January 2014 to the way the government collects and uses telephone 
records, particularly forbidding eavesdropping on the leaders of allied 
countries127. He has to ponder the huge side effect of the mistrust of the US by 
the EU institutions and EU citizens.  
The reaction of the European Parliament towards the US NSA scandal has not 
imposed negative factor to the legislative function of the Council. They stand for 
different interests, thus it’s of no use to compare the two. Rather, the 
complimentary positions represented by three core institutions benefits the EU 
by a welcomed outcome that the US has to show its respect to the EU and EU’s 
fundamental principles. Also, this triangle check and balance demonstrates the 
comprehensive strength of EU, which is necessary for enhancing the external 
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and internal credibility when negotiating and implementing the international 
agreements. 
To conclude on the three case studies, European Parliament’s power is 
revolutionary after Lisbon Treaty. It is well aware of the significant role and has 
implemented it concretely and diligently, functioning as one of the gatekeepers 
for the protection of general principles and fundamental rights in EU’s 
international agreements. 
Democracy and transparency are of essence to give it legitimacy of 
International Agreements from the aspect of EU. Thus the Commission and 
Council have to respect the primary legal obligation to have the European 
Parliament being well revolved.  
2.4  Updated idea before concluding case studies 
In January 2014, EU has just opened the negotiation with China on the foreign 
direct investment agreement. Early in July of 2010, the Commission 
communicated the necessity of negotiation with China for a stand-alone 
investment agreement. February 2012, heads of EU and China agreed to move 
forwards and prepare to set the agenda for the negotiation. One year later, both 
the Council and European Parliament published their opinion/ resolution on this 
issue.  
On the side of the European Parliament, it devoted to open the negotiation 
with China, since China has been of significance on the trade and investment 
strategy of EU. Although the Parliamentary Resolution128 was not of binding 
effect, the European Parliament took it truly serious listing down a variety of 
concerns. Those concerns were generally categorized into two parts: “market 
access” and “investor protection”. For the first category, the European 
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Parliament mainly stressed on: the openness of China’s investment market, 
reformation of the form of joint venture and eliminating the dominant position of 
state owned enterprises. For the second, the Parliamentary concerns are: 
protection of business confidential, protection of intellectual property right, 
protection of small and medium size enterprises, protection against direct and 
indirect expropriation.  
Beyond the concrete opinion, the European Parliament expressed the criticism 
of the unreliability of China’s judicial system. And also it implied the existing 
legal instrument to be the obstacle for full protection of European investigator 
and even may derogate the industrial interest of EU in a long term. The 
European Parliament also treated the resolution tackling the “solar panels” 
distribute as a sample or a pre-condition for the upcoming investment 
negotiation.  
To sum up all the “concerns” above, one can immediately realize that they are 
the parliamentary mandate on the Commission. Therefore, once again, the 
European Parliament demonstrates its potential input to an international 
agreement, which would have actual binding result without a legally binding 
nature. 
On the other side of the Council, situation was not alike ACTA or SWIFT. It 
took the Council almost two years to give it official mandate to open the 
negotiation. The reason is the nature of the envisaged agreement. This EU-China 
investment agreement will be the first investment agreement concluded only on 
the stand of the Union, where there have been 26 bilateral investment 
agreements between EU Member States and China. After the entry into force of 
Lisbon Treaty, Common Commercial Policy has been ruled falling into the fields 
applying co-legislative procedure (article 207 TFEU) and EU exclusive 
competence (article 3 TFEU). Furthermore, foreign direct investment, for the 
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first time as well, becomes within Common Commercial Policy (article 207 
TFEU). That means the newly concluded international agreements on investment 
by the EU shall not need the conclusion by each Member State and it is within 
the Union’s exclusive competence to negotiate. As the result, the EU investment 
agreement will replace all the bilateral agreements between the Member States 
and third party. It is not the harmonization of national rules, but is over-riding 
and replacing the latter. Besides, according to the treaty norms (article 207 (4) 
2nd subparagraph), investment agreement requires unanimity voting in the 
Council.  
These facts, with no doubt, trigger much more debate or negotiation inside the 
Council. Each Member State has the veto power. Foreign direct investment is 
extremely sensitive for almost all the Member States, because they all have to 
consider the large scale of benefit from the ever vast market in China on one 
hand; meanwhile, they shall be confronted with the legal system of this 
developing country on the other hand. Opportunity lives with the risk. This is 
why the Council gave the Commission the negotiating mandate until 18th 
October 2013.  
From the case of EU-China investment agreement, the relationship between 
the Council and the European Parliament does not reflect any changing character: 
the Council would respect and take into account the Parliamentary opinions; the 
latter will keep an eye at all phases of negotiation. The only subtle fluctuation is 
the changing nature of investment policy referring to Union’s competence. 
Therefore, in this case, people will witness the debate and compromise more in 
the Council rather than between the institutions.   
SECTION 3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S “HEARING POWER”  
Art 230 TFEU imposes the obligations of the Commission to reply orally and 
 101 / 141 
 
in writing the questions put to it by the European Parliament. Likely, art 36 TEU 
provides that now the Council also has to response to the questions or accept the 
recommendations made by the European Parliament mentioning the common 
foreign and security policy. In addition, “the European Council and the Council 
shall be heard by the European Parliament in accordance with the conditions laid 
down in the Rules of Procedure of the European Council and those of the 
Council.” (Art 230 TFEU) It can be observed that European Parliament’s power 
has indeed increased and it control the Council as close as possible. 
SECTION 4. BUDGETARY BATTLE FIELD  
Budgetary power has been a “hot” topic for quite a long time. There are 
several steps which build up the budgetary edifice altogether: the Own 
Resources, the Financial Perspectives (now the Multiannual Financial 
Framework), the Annual Budget and the Financial Regulation. Here we examine 
them one by one to find out what are changed by the entry into force of Lisbon 
Treaty.  
1. The Own Resources  
The “Own Resources” indicates that the EU is financed on its own, or to say 
on the direct contribution from the Member States. The concept has not been 
changed by the Treaty of Lisbon. The procedure adopting regulations on Own 
Resources does not changed as well, remaining subjected to unanimity voting in 
the Council after consulting the European Parliament and the approval by the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements129. 
It is not surprising that the relation between the Council and the European 
Parliament does not change. Because before 1970s the European Parliament had 
already started to struggle for the involvement and the first secondary law on 
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own resource was the fruit of that struggling. What is new by the Treaty of 
Lisbon is the “implementing measures” adopted by the Council after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament130, in which the procedure only needs 
QMV in the Council since there is no indication of unanimity voting. In this 
sense, the Council has more power on putting forward the measures on the 
Member States’ contribution which gives chances to the Member States to fully 
negotiate on the specific items according to diversified situations. 
2. The Financial Perspectives 
The “Financial Perspectives” was the measure to settle down the Union’s 
financial framework valid for five to seven years, providing annual ceiling for 
the total maximum expenditure and separated ceiling for each category of 
expenditure. It was reached through inter-institutional agreement by the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament and did not derive from 
the EU legal order. It just could have legal binging effects between the three 
institutions. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the Multiannual Financial Framework 
has been codified in the Treaties (Art 312 TFEU), which is almost the same core 
content as the former Financial Perspectives. Comparing with the situation 
pre-Lisbon, the legal nature shifts to a primary law provision; in the Council, 
unanimity should be reached while the parliamentary consent is also necessary 
for the adoption; there is the measure of safeguarding the stability by which the 
“last year provisions” shall be extended when the new financial framework has 
not been adopted. (Art 312(4) TFEU) These creations enhances the role of two 
legislatures especially the European Parliament by codifying it as a truly 
co-legislature in this significant policy field. 
3. The Annual Budget  
The “Annual Budget” is another real battle field. The Council originally was 
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the exclusive institution enjoying the power to budget by the Treaty of Rome. 
Since 1970s until before the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has 
obtained the final say on “non-compulsory expenditure”, while the Council 
keeps the last word on “compulsory expenditure”. The Treaty of Lisbon 
abolishes the classification of “compulsory expenditure” and “non-compulsory 
expenditure”. To the consequence, the European Parliament has obtained ever 
powerful strength controlling over the whole budgetary policy, for instance, the 
common agricultural policy was “compulsory expenditure” under the control of 
the Council before while now the European Parliament also share the equal 
footing on it. Other than the victory on the policy fields, the new procedure 
adopting the final acts on EU budget again favors the European Parliament. 
Comparing with the provisions in TEC, TFEU adds new features to budgetary 
legislation. After the reading by both of the two budgetary authorities, the 
meeting of Conciliation Committee may be convened. As similar with the 
conciliation committee phase in the ordinary legislative procedure, the 
conciliation committee composes of representatives from the Council, equal 
number representatives from the European Parliament and the Commission. Its 
task is to agree on a joint text. Afterward, the approval of the joint text witnesses 
the growing power of the European Parliament. On one hand, the European 
Parliament has a unique veto power (rather than the Council) to call for a new 
draft budget submitted by the Commission when the Council approves the joint 
text but the European Parliament rejects. On the other hand, when the European 
Parliament approves but the Council rejects, the former one firstly has the 
opportunity to still confirm on its amendment which is the version before the 
conciliation committee and may adopt the budget according to that version, or 
otherwise the version with accordance to the joint text shall be adopted. 
Basically, in the Conciliation Committee, the representatives of the Council are 
the COREPER who are the central negotiators and decision makers inside the 
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Council. As far as the joint text being reached by the COREPER, it is not likely 
that the Council will reject on that ground. Nevertheless, “more unpredictable is 
the vote of the Plenary of the European Parliament on the results that its 
representatives have achieved at the Conciliation Committee; if negative, such a 
vote leads to the rejection of the budget.”131 Although by the failure of approval 
by the European Parliament will not lead to an amendment solely by the latter, 
within the new draft budget by the Commission it is possible contains the 
parliamentary input  by whatever reasons such as the political-control pressure 
by the European Parliament on the Commission. Obviously, the European 
Parliament totally is the winner over the Council throughout the provisions on 
the abovementioned procedure.  
4. The Financial Regulation  
The “Financial Regulation” is the secondary law on behalf of the Treaty, 
implementing the budget. Before Lisbon, the adoption of this legal instrument 
was on the basis of consulting procedure132. A new change brought by the Treaty 
of Lisbon is the application of ordinary legislative procedure133 which the 
European Parliament continues to share the authority with the Council when the 
budget comes to the implementing phase. The only ease for the Council here is 
the replace of former “unanimity” by now the “QMV”. 
SECTION 5. INSTITUTIONAL TRIANGLE IN THE LIGHT OF 
INTER-INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS  
In the triangle of these three institutions, the relation between the European 
Parliament and the Council “should rather be seen as political co-operation and 
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partnership”134 while the relation of European Parliament and Commission is 
“one of political supervision and co-operation”. The latter sometimes becomes a 
conspiracy against the Council which after all, in certain cases still wields the 
ultimate legislative power within the Union”135the main competitors finally 
appear to be the European Parliament and the Council. The best example in this 
sense is the Framework Agreement signed by the European Parliament and the 
Commission. On 20th October 2010, the European Parliament adopted another 
new framework agreement after 5 year from 2005 and the Commission 
immediately signed on it. This version of framework agreement (to be called 
“Commission-EP 2010” hereinafter) gained wide attention on it because it is the 
first one after the Treaty of Lisbon. The characteristics of the Commission-EP 
2010 is worthy of discussion. 
Firstly, the Commission-EP 2010 is not a multilateral inter-institutional 
agreement. Multilateral inter-institutional agreements hold the aim of facilitating 
the work and wide consent among the institutions. Under the principle of 
“sincere cooperation” early stated by Article 10 TEC, the institutions often resort 
to inter-institutional agreements to compensate for the shortcomings of the 
Treaty, or to enhance their powers indirectly, or to avoid inter-institutional 
conflict, or to find an easier way to implement the Treaty rather than amend the 
Treaty. They can compensate for the shortcomings of the Treaties and facilitating 
inter-institutional relations, prepare the content of future treaties and put an end 
to conflict between institutions.136 In a word, “according to the Declaration No 3 
annexed to the Nice Treaty, inter-institutional agreements could only enforce the 
provisions of the Treaty and had to be signed by all three institutions. However, 
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this declaration was a political one, without any binding legal effect.”137 But it 
gave the label to this kind of agreements of “requiring the consent of the three 
institutions”138 
Secondly, the Commission-EP 2010 signed by the European Parliament and 
the Commission does not own the same aim as the typical inter-institutional 
agreement mentioned above. Above all, the Commission-EP 2010 is bilateral not 
multilateral, which triggered the criticism of the Council by claiming alternatives 
of the institutional balance as laid down in the Treaties. To be followed, these 
Commission-EP 2010 “are made at the beginning of a new parliamentary term to 
govern relations between the Commission and the newly elected European 
Parliament, and are not designed to enforce a particular provision of the Treaties.” 
139 
Last but not the least, from the Commission-EP 2010, the European 
Parliament still keeps obtaining new pledges from the Commission so that the 
European Parliament will be better informed or consulted, and then its views and 
demands will be taken more to the initiative phase and gains ever stronger 
political control power in the legislative procedure. Similarly, the Commission 
gets more political support from the European Parliament rather than be “fired” 
as a whole under the motion of censure by the latter as a result of being lack of 
trust between the two.  
To view the text of the Commission-EP 2010, the written aim of it is to 
improve the flow of information between the two institutions and to improve 
cooperation on procedures and planning extended constructive dialogue. In the 
view of the European Parliament, the necessity of Commission-EP 2010 lays in 
its fully involvement as the same as the manner of the Commission treating with 
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the Council in any step of decision-making process, which is called the basic 
principle of equal treatment for Parliament and the Council in paragraph 9 in that 
text140. In exchange, the European Parliament promotes itself to the Commission 
that it would offer the strengthened political responsibility and legitimacy of the 
latter. 
The most frequently used words are “in good time”, “immediately”, “in due 
time”, “fully informed”. They are, not the least, the requirements ensuring the 
European Parliament in control over the entire pace through the Commission. 
The parliamentary supervision starts before the Commission is formed. The 
nominated President of the Commission shall present the European Parliament 
his/her political guideline before the assent given by the latter. And the European 
Parliament also requests the full information of every designed Commissioner 
before their officially coming into competence. The Commissioners have duty to 
keep close responsibility with competence parliamentary Committees. When the 
European Parliament withdraw the confidence of any Commissioner or desire to 
replace them, the President of the Commission shall “seriously consider” the 
parliamentary opinion, where the European Parliament may exert political 
pressure on the Commission President to conduct the his/her power conferred by 
the TEU in paragraph 2 of Article 17(6). In the process of legislation, the 
Commission undertakes the duty to notify the European Parliament its position 
and initiative from the intention of proposal until the adoption. Even in the area 
of the CFSP, the Commission shall take measures to better involve the European 
Parliament in such a way as to take Parliament’s views into account as far as 
possible. (Paragraph 10 of Framework Agreement on relations between the 
European Parliament and the European Commission, 2010)  
On the accession to confidential documents, the European Parliament may 
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request on all the classified information of EU, including classified and 
non-classified information141. The classified information composes four types 
which the EU TOP SECRET is also listed, according to Annex Ⅱ to the 
Commission-EP 2010. Although the access to information is supported by 
primary EU law (Art. 218(10) TFEU) and it is truly an obligation respected by 
the institutions, it is still a sensitive issue to conduct the handing over of the 
confidential information. The balance of political support and protection of 
confidential information may drive the Commission into dilemma.  
 
At the aspect of international agreements, in primary law, there is no 
delegation power for the European Parliament in the negotiation or in the 
international conference. The only possibility of parliamentary involvement is 
the right to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure 
(Article 218(10) TFEU). The European Parliament gives its own understanding 
of this provision, relying on inter-institutional agreement for the purpose of 
better transparency on international agreements negotiation and for avoiding 
institutional structure clashes which is very negative for the credibility and 
effectiveness of international action. In addition, EP holds serious attitude to its 
raised power on international agreements. EP is really active in negotiating 
inter-institutional agreements serving its conducting of its veto power upon 
envisaged EU international agreements after Lisbon Treaty. 
In the Commission-EP 2010, the European Parliament is requesting seats for 
the delegation of MEPs as observers and the rights to access to all EU delegation 
facilities, by adding duties on the Commission to provide facility to the 
former.142 In addition, the European Parliament’s view or Recommendation, 
                                                             
141
 Point 1.2.1 of Annex Ⅱ to “Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, 2010”. 
142
 Subparagraph 2 of paragraph 25 and paragraph 27 of “Framework Agreement on relations 
 109 / 141 
 
after being fully informed by the Commission of the progress of negotiation, 
seems to be duly supported in the Commission. If the Commission fails to 
support the parliamentary Recommendation for important reasons, the 
Commission shall explain in Plenary or relevant Committees (Paragraph 28,29 
of Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the 
European Commission,2010, and paragraph 3,4 of Annex Ⅲ to this Framework 
Agreement). It implies that other than important reasons, the Commission would 
corporate the parliamentary input rather than trapping in political trouble. 
Besides Commission-EP 2010, it is of necessity to refer to another 
inter-institutional agreement-“Inter-institutional Agreement between the 
European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling 
by the European Parliament of classified information held by the Council on 
matters other than those in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
13 September 2012” (to be called “Council-EP 2012” in short hereinafter). 
Council-EP 2012 is a supplemental version of a similar Council-European 
Parliament inter-institutional agreement signed in 2002 (“Inter-institutional 
Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information 
of the Council in the field of security and defense policy”, to be called “Council- 
EP for CFSP 2002” in short hereinafter). The difference lays in the subject 
matter. The earlier dated one only refers to the confidential documents on CFSP, 
while the more recent one provides solution on access to all the other 
confidential files with the exception of the ones of CFSP.  
Council-EP 2012 less restricts the regime than the mode of the Council- EP 
for CFSP 2002. The version of 2002 provided the EP the right to accession to 
CFSP confidential information, but only at the headquarters of the Council. It 
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was inconvenience of the MEPs to travel to Brussels when they were in the 
plenary session in Strasbourg143. Now the 2012 one facilitates the European 
Parliament that the latter could access to confidential information other than 
CFSP just at the headquarters of the Plenary. 
In a word, the Commission-EP 2010 tends to combine the Commission upon 
the European Parliament as “special partnership” through both the political 
pressure and legitimacy reward, in order for the latter to keep at least equal pace 
with the Council.  
Commission-EP 2010 and Council-EP 2012 both give priority to transparency. 
In this sense, with the raising power of EP, international agreements are not 
concluded behind closed doors. Democracy, represented by the EP, will be the 
essence and necessity. 
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CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 3 
To build the co-legislature relationship with the European Parliament 
indeed benefits the Council’s legislative function.  
At the first glance at the changes in the Lisbon Treaty, the Council’s power 
declines and it has to share the competence on equal footing with the European 
Parliament. And the European Parliament gets much power and makes itself a 
strong polar to establish an institutional triangle.  
However, there are reasonable factors for this arrangement. For example, 
“all the Member States agreed that something had to be done in order to 
convince the EU citizens that the EU is a democratic entity and that its 
decision-making process is effectively in the hands of elected politicians.”144  
It is the combination of inter-governmental and community method, rather 
than the politicians’ deal, that fills the gap of democratic deficit so as to promote 
the legitimacy of legislative function of the Council.  
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CONCLUSION  
The Council is one of the first established institutions along the history of 
European Union (European Community). The main designed competence of the 
Council has been the legislation for the Union (Community) and 
inter-governmental coordination. During the practice of legislation, to accord on 
the legislative intention and to amend the envisaged acts, negotiation among 
Member States is inevitable. National interests are diverse; internal legal orders 
are of difference; the economic, history, social, cultural and even religious 
factors could probably turn into the central debate in inter-governmental 
negotiation. Within a considerable period, the Council has been playing the role 
of the forum for political communication. Even if large Member States in this 
region would differ this political process (in way of delay or promoting145), the 
rotating presidency Member States are the chief propellers for the achievement 
of negotiations inside the Council in a large scale in history and in the sense of 
legal competence. 
Alongside with the deepened economic integration, the requirement of the 
EU (EC) political coordination became prominent, especially in the sphere of 
internal market and finance where may lead to certain political issue. Beyond the 
legal competence, politicians preferred to negotiate above all. Only when they 
drew the conclusion on certain policy-making idea, the legislative procedure was 
launched officially in the Council. The ministers’ level meeting in the Council 
could not fulfill the high political communication, which accelerated the 
establishment of European Council in 1975 as the political club for the heads of 
states or governments in EU (EC). Even though the two “councils” are of 
different concepts, the rotating presidency of the Council chaired the operation 
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in European Council at the same time. That was the Council possessed both 
legislative competence and political communication role at the highest level. The 
double role of the Council has been maintained until the entering in to force of 
Lisbon Treaty. For this days and the age, the Council has to be confronted with 
the fact of losing chairmanship of the European Council and transferring its 
previous high political role to the latter which has been confirmed by the 
Treaties as an official Union institution, where leaves the functioning role for the 
Council. It calls for the Council to wait for general mandate or inter-government 
agreement from the European Council at almost all the time, until the Council 
could commence the legislative procedure as its own functional competence. 
Neither the Council’s rotating presidency nor could the ministers of Member 
States impose remarkable influence upon the substantial decision in the 
European Council.  
This changing role of the Council is revolutionary. The former double role 
has been cut to half and the influential power of the Council cannot be 
mentioned in the same breath with the situation before Lisbon. The only focal 
point that may attract attention is the inter-governmental debate on technical 
issue and at low political level, which constructs the functional role rather than 
political importance as before the Lisbon Treaty.  
On the internal decision-making scheme, there are remarkable changes on 
treaty norms. The Treaties list the Qualified Majority Voting as a general rule 
and sum up the proportion of population as a second threshold. The normative 
changes ease the difficulty of adopting decisions, on the one hand; also, those 
new norms protect the smaller Member States and increase the democratic tone 
where the EU citizens would feel like being involved, where “what was once the 
so called ‘democratic deficit’ has been progressively filled.… there needs to 
develop a vision of Europe which also offers to the EU citizens the ground for a 
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European identity.”146 
However, from the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty until now, regardless 
the transitional provisions, there has been no difference of the working 
procedure and method in the Council: Working Groups analyze the draft acts at 
the first step, categorize and pass them to the central section ---- COREPER 
level; COREPER I and II exam the acts according to the policy field or level 
those issue may relate to, where the draft acts are under through the substantial 
discussion and debate; to the very end, the meetings of ministers’ level would 
decide on a small proportion of issues, which is rare, and vote just as an 
procedural performance. The custom formed from long-time practice in 
COREPER is like that: the draft act would be amended until it receives 
agreement from all the representatives from each Member State, or at least can 
gather sufficient supporting votes which are necessary for the potential majority 
voting. Therefore, even though the treaty norms bring reformation to voting 
system in the Council, most of the decisions will still be adopted in the way of 
unanimous. The new “double majority voting system” would act as the hanging 
stone to be actually applied when Member States negotiate before drawing any 
resolution. Most Member States do not decline to become the minority at any 
time, unless the situation is of gravity concerning national interest, when the 
majorities endorse the adoption. As a result, even if the deadline of 1st November 
2014 for the application of new voting method is approaching, the de facto 
working practice in the Council would not differ largely. 
It is the most complicated and subtle situation of the inter-institutional 
relationship. 
Back to the early age of the creation of EU (EC) institutions, the Council, 
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the Commission (High Authority) and European Parliament (the Assembly) 
were the main organs on decision-making. The inter-institutional relationship 
was not similar as nowadays. The Commission was powerful with strong 
executive competence; the Council provided with political mandate and 
legislation for all policies in the Union (Community); the European Parliament 
was the weakest institution at that time because the treaty norms did not vest it 
with decisive policy-making power. This mode of institutional relation has 
maintained until the Maastricht Treaty which for the first time provided the 
European Parliament with a block power in co-operation legislative procedure. 
Although the fields applying co-operation rules were not so widespread, the 
European Parliament was right on the high way to seek equal-footing with the 
Council. 
 Lisbon Treaty promoted the European Parliament with the milestone in 
the EU legislative history that the European Parliament shall be one of the 
co-legislatures and, as a common rule, shall always have a say in EU 
policy-making process. In order to play well as a pure legislature, the Council 
has to compromise, to some extent, to safeguard the legislative and budgetary 
arena, even though the European Parliament is digging the wall to gain more 
power.  
In the details of procedural provisions, the European Parliament even 
possesses more opportunities of veto voting as an overwhelmed blocking force 
ever. For example, in the first and second reading in ordinary legislative 
procedure, Council cannot cast veto votes to terminate any draft act where it can 
solely deliver amendment to the Commission’s proposal or the Parliamentary 
opinion, while the European Parliament can deny the adoption of the draft acts.  
In the field of international agreements concluded by the EU with third 
parties, the European Parliament remains the final decisive power on almost all 
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the international agreements due to the side-effect of general application of 
co-legislative procedure.  
Besides the treaty norms, the European Parliament, by its Rules of 
Procedure and Inter-institutional Agreements with the Commission and with the 
Council, not only has the right to be fully informed in all phases of international 
negotiation and in the legislative procedure, but also is able to access to 
confidential documents on CFSP. The European Parliament could seize the 
approximately accurate intention of the Council, and the latter would be 
considered as lack of transparency if avoiding the former from being detected.  
This first ever structural reformation leads the Council to be less strategic 
when referring to the Parliamentary bird’s eye. This passive news for the 
Council is not the negative one for the Union. The vast information flow 
between institutions, especially before the decision made by each of them, do 
reduce the possibility of controversy or at least cut to short the time consuming 
tackling the institutional compromise, which is beneficial for enhancing the 
Union’s legislative interest and for promoting the quality of legal acts adopted 
by Union institutions.  
The Commission, as an advocator to the Union, is undertaking more 
workload on non-legislative act making. As one of the initiators and scrutinizers, 
the Council eases itself from the complex technical questions in order to keep 
energetic force on essential legal and low political issues, which pushes up its 
legislative function to be concentrate and efficient.  
The relationship between the Council and the Commission has transformed 
due to the raising power of the European Parliament. The European Parliament 
possessed more political control power upon the Commission than that deriving 
from the Council. This is the main reason why the European Parliament can 
break the line linking the Council and the Commission which has been existed 
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for dozens of years. 
Before Lisbon Treaty, the Council was the only main legislative operator 
both upstream and downstream from the Commission. After Lisbon, the 
European Council became the one seating upstream while the European 
Parliament joins in the downstream side. In addition to the legislative relations, 
the European Parliament uniquely support the Commission in way of both 
politics and democracy, from coming into office of the Commission’s president 
and all the Commissioners to the censure motion during Commission five-year 
term. The Commission prefers to fill the democratic deficit by obeying the 
Parliamentary supervision. Whereas, this string is what the Council does not 
possess. To utilize the Commission, the European Parliament wins over the 
Council on information flowing, which has been discussed above, and also on 
final deciding power. The Council seems to fade after Lisbon Treaty. If the 
rotating presidency Member States are not the ones of relatively great influence, 
such as Greece who is trapped with economic and social morass, the Council’s 
power would decline much more. 
The 2014 European Parliament election is on the near schedule. If more 
seats are for the centre-left coalition, the European Parliament will perform more 
Parliamentary power against the collective will of Member States (the Council) 
if the MEPs consider it is necessary.  
Without a doubt, indeed, the European Parliament is not the rival of the 
Council. To the practice after Lisbon Treaty, the former has been quite 
cooperative in EU law-making. The high quality level of Parliamentary input 
safeguards the legal instruments with democratic basis and transparency, which 
convinces the EU citizens with the accomplished protection for them.   
The evolution of the Council’s function is a process to do subtraction. In the 
light of deepened European integration, political integration requires institutions 
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with clarified, differentiated and specialized competences.  
The Lisbon Treaty stresses the nature of the Council’s function as 
legislative and budgetary ones, which should be the only essence for a legislative 
institution.  
The Council stands for the states’ interests and diversity national voices. 
And it is an irreplaceable efficient institution to swiftly foster Member States’ 
positions and feedbacks, and to find a relatively largely supportive solution for 
the daily decision-making of the EU. Although in practice there is still criticism 
on its true transparency, “efficiency” could somewhere prevail with the principle 
of proportionality since there is the European Parliament symbolizing the 
“democracy”. 
We are witnessing the decline of an inter-governmental method. At the 
meanwhile, we had better to celebrate for the rise of community method. After 
the re-balancing, the inter-institutional relationship proves to be reasonable and 
legitimate. 
The Treaty of Lisbon never defines the winner or the loser among the 
institutions, but gives impetus to the evolution of them. The dominate objective 
is to enhance the present EU integration and to draw it up to a higher level, in 
order for this largest regional economy to sail safe and sound in a globalized 
scale.  
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